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Introduction. 
The Period of German Occupation. 
By the war of 1870 between France and Germany, the 
old balance of power in Europe was destroyed; that new 
ranging of nations sida by aide~ or facing one another, 
which has prevailed until 1914, came into existence only 
with the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria in 1879; 
and with the Franco-Russian entente whose existence came 
to be recognized in the early nineties. There intervened, 
therefore, a period ot transition, while the balance was 
still uncertain, and while Europe watched warily for the 
next move that m~ swing the scale. This is the decade 
with which this stuQy concerns itself, treating of French 
and German relations. In this brief period. again, suc-
cessive phases can be traced~ The years of German occupa-
tion of the French departments, when Germany dominated 
in most decided fashion; and when France remained the 
suppliant, though the Peace of Frankfort was in opera-
tion. Next, after the evacuation of Verdun in the fall 
-. - -
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of 1873. came the period when Franoe was working b ~k 
again to independenoe. and recovering bit by bit her 
place as a European power---if never again ~ European 
power. Germany. meanwhile, was changing her policy not 
at all to suit the altered situation in France. In 1875, 
oame the oris is; when German dominance and Fr ench inde-
pendence were alike tested; with the result that France 
from 1876 on was allowed to go her own way, and that 
Germany began to seek security for 'her new posit ion other-
wise than in bullying France. The recovery of the latter 
is signalized in the Congress of Berlin. in which, impo-
tent as France knew herself to be to strike out any indi-
vidual path of action, she found herself besougnt to fol-
low the various leaders in that body; her approval played 
for. her influence desirable. When Germany and Austria 
in 1879 assumed the defensive against Russia. it became 
plain that France was to be left to herself; and the 
atory of her caDmercial and colonial expansion from the 
eighties onward tells us how steadily, if not brilliantly, 
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she has made use of her regained freedom. 
This paper proposes to treat in some detail the 
series of inoiaents and interviews which mark the reas-
sumption on the part of Franoe of her independenoe of 
German suggestion-- so far as any country is ever "inde-
pendent" of its neighbors. One of those generalizations 
oi' whioh Bisma.rck---vast, looming figures in the back-
ground of any event of this time--- is found, expresses 
'the philosophy of the thing: "The politioal relations 
between independent powers are the outoome of an unbr.oken 
series of events arising either from conflict, or from 
the objection of one or the other of the parties to re-
newing the conflict , ff (1) A dreary doctrine, this; and 
one which idealists have fought--- are fighting--
against. In all its grimness, it explains those years 
with which we have to deal. 
The two and a half years immediat ely succeeding the 
War of 18?O illustrate the principle peculiarly. There 
is here little effort. on the part of Germany to dissim-
ulate her threat of "renewing the conflict," and little 
(1) Bismarck. the Man and the Statesman .. II, p. 149. 
:3 
Peace 
Negotia-
tions. 
effort possible to France of dissimulating her dread. 
Though the supposedly definitive Peace of Frankfort was 
signed May tenth, 1871, the German ambassador to Paris 
• wrote thereafter: "The situation seemed actually more 
like a truoe." (2) and these words were echoed by many 
others of the actors in these perilous days, both French 
and German. Beoause of the extra.ordinary charaoter of 
the period. it will be trea.ted in a somewhat introductory 
fashion. and in less detail than the ensuing years. 
Th e p'ace negotiations were first crystallized in 
the Preliminary Negotiations of Versailles ,concluded the 
twenty-sixth of February, 1871. (3) On the twenty-fourth 
of March began a conference at Brussels for the determin-
ation of minor matt~rs. The speoial representatives of 
each nation---!lessieurs Baude and Goulard for the Frenoh. 
and von Arnim and von Balan for the German---were assis't-
ed by a mixed military commission. This conferenoe, 
whiCh dragged on to the fourth of May, struok the keynote 
of the attitude of both countries fo~ the next years. 
(2) Arnim to Bismarck, Staatsarohiv. 28, #5396. See the 
remark of Gontaut-Biron. Meine Botschatterkeit am :Berliner 
H2!. p.155. WWe remained in reality their opponents, and 
indeed t~eir conquered opponents, and all our negotiations---
awakened the paricular mistrust of the German government. " 
(German translation used.) 
(3) Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, III, #438. 
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Germany made proposals not indicated in the Preliminary 
Treaty of Versailles: the p~ent of the entire indem-
nity in coin, the seizure of the railw~s 1n the depart-
ments of German occupation with insufficient compensation. 
The French in self-defense made counter-proposals, and 
were reproached for ~ttempting to violate the provisions 
of the Versailles agreement, and introduce features dis-
advantageous to Germany. Bismarck himself appeared be-
fore the Reichstag, on the occasion of the third reading 
of a bill to empower the Chancellor to use further appro-
priations for military expenses---e!gnificant in itself---
to declare that the Brussels conference was accomplishing 
nothing, and to suggest that the French government delayeq 
in order to make more ambitious stipulations at a later 
time. (4)He put graphically before the assembly the sup· 
posed danger that French prisoners of war, released by 
Germany, would rejoin the French.army, and create or fos-
ter a radical anti-German spirit there. (5) He stated the 
fact, with ~ speaking absence of comment, that the 
(4) Kohl, Die Po11tische Reden des F~rstenBismarcks,V,pp. 
43-49. 
(5) This problem according to the German plan would be solved 
5 
by the prohibition on such soldiers entering th~ ~ before 
the complete execution of the peace.Ae this wourd have hindered 
the reconstitution of the ~ the one aim of all others which 
Thiers at that moment cherisheA~(see below Chap.~,note 7)the 
French made a counter-proposition which involved the neutrality 
of a strip between the SeIne and the Loire. The troops were so ~peratively needed fQr inner order that Germany acceded The 
,?utbreak of troub~e8 1n Parl s navlng made tne p'!'esence or troops 
1n the neutralized district necessary,Germany Qonsidered herself 
absolved from her side of the 1argain ,and reta1ned the prisoners 
of war. ' 
French had so far failed to meet the financia 1 stipula-
-.......I 
tions of the treaty, although they had promised to pay 
all arrears by the twenty-fifth of the month, (April). 
The speech then closed with an enunciation of the prin-
ciple of non-interference of Germany in French internal 
affairs, and of Germany's right of action contrary to 
the general principle in case her own interests were 
threatened. She must be Rtrong p.nough to meet any even-
tuality ~risi~ out of French disorder---n fine phrase 
calculated to touch the exaggerated patriotism of victor-
ious Germany, to induce the Diet to vote the credits. and 
to strike terror to the heart of ~rance. 
Vuring April and May the governments were carrying 
on negotiations in three places at once;Berlin, Brussels, 
and Compiegne. where Manteuffel, the general-in-chief of 
the army of ocoupation, was located, and received French 
negotiators. The intention was to facilitate matters by 
this multiplicity of points of conference; but as might 
have been foreseen, and probably was foreseen by Bismarck, 
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it only resulted in complications. The question of 
Belfort. and the French sphere of action around the town 
were the debated points. (6) The definition of the new 
boundary. too, roused antagonistic feeling in Germany, 
since the popular idea was that Bismarck had not claimed 
. enough. and that Belfort. in particular, should not have 
been given up. On the other hand. feeling in the former 
French provinces made th~ work of delineating the boun-
daries almost ~possible. So soon as the surveyors 
would plant their stakes, signifying the hateful fact 
of German possession, the inhabitants would follow after 
and pull them up again. 
At last. however. Bismarck appeared resolved to has-
ten matters. A letter from von Fabrice, one of the German 
negotiators. to Thiers. aCCUsed France in the most per-
emptory tone of delaying the conclUsion of the definitive 
peace. (?) Thiers replied with his usual suavity that 
Franoe intended no hindrance to the negotiations. and 
that any such interpretation of his instructions by his 
representatIves was a mistake. He advocated. also, the 
(6) See Map, Appendix B. 
(?) Occupation et Liberation du Territolre. #1 and 2, 
Bismarck's change of attitude 1a possibly explained by 
his statement in laa? about this very matter: "I was 
at that time muoh worried abou~ the intervention of neutrals. 
and had been wondering for months that we did not receive a 
note from neutral nations." Pol.Re9!~II.p.18? We »now that 
Bismarck would not risk European interference, in spite of 
his assurances from Russia. 
? 
simplest and surest way of arriving at an understanding. 
This, in his opinion. was a meeting between Bismarck, 
just returning to his post. and JUles Favre and Monsieur 
Pouyer-~ertier. (8) This accomplished, according to 
Thiers' suggestion, the matters in dispute were quickly 
settled; as indeed was ordained the instant_ that the 
German chanoe11or desired settlement. The treaty of 
Frankfort was finally signed Uay tenth and ratified 
soon after. (9). It might have been expected to provide 
the final settlement of problems of Franco-German rela-
tions, considering the ttme and care devoted to its form-
ulation. But, to quote again from Bismarck, "All treat-
ies of peace in this world are prOVisional, and hold 
good only for a time.· The "provisional" character of 
this treaty was emphasized by the number of conventions 
necessary, in the course of the succeeding months, for 
the further arrangement of affairs. And even then, the 
perusal of the treaties,of the conventions of the twenty-
first of Kay, and twelfth October, 1871, of June twenty-
ninth, 1872, and of March fifteenth, 1873, (10) gives 
(8) Foreign minister, and minister of Finance, respectively. 
(9) Hertslet. Yap II, #446. See also Al\lpendix B, at end of 
this paper. The Journal Official t ,hrows much light on the 
state of French teeling, in its reports of the discussion 
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in the Assembly before the ratification. Vol.I for 1871, 
p.959,988-993. 1013, 1051. Bismarck's report to the Reichstag, 
Pol.Red.V ,p. 70. 
(10) See reference belOW. 
Resump-
tion of 
Diplo-
matic 
Rela-
tions. 
only the vaguest and most inadequate idea of the volumin-
ous interchange of notes which marks the anxious effort 
of France to oatch her breath; the insistence of Germany; 
her arbitrary irritability, and supersensitive fear that 
conditions are not as hard for France as they might be. 
European opinion of the peace was variously ex-
, 
pressed. De Gabriac, charge d'affaires in Berlin, was 
told by a "prominent dIplomat" of Russia: -You will long 
be a charge d'affaires. For the actual peace is only a 
dream, until France has recovered her strength in the 
next war." (11) This view, according to de Gabriac and 
his confidant, was widely held in political and financial 
circles. That it was justified in the spirit, if not in 
the letter, later events proved. 
The resumption of diplomatiC relations which actual-
ly. more than the signature of the formal treaty, gave 
witness that the war was done, took place early in the 
summer of 18?1. Von Fabrice, the prOVisional plenipoten-
tiary to the Frenoh government, was replaced on the 
(11) A familiar phrase in 1915. The quotation from de 
Gab~iac. Souvenirs Diplomatigues. p.ll? 
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, 
twenty-seventh of June by Count von Waldersee, charge 
d'affaires. (12) The Marquis de Gahriac went f rom a 
post in St. Petersburg to Berlin, after receiving full 
instructions at Paris; he took up his new duties on the 
fourth of July. The representatives were of the rank of 
charg~ d' ai'fairss, rather than of ambassador. as being 
less in the pUblic eye"and better able to avoid embar-
rassment. It was thQught impossible to send ambassadors, 
so soon after the close of the war, and during the period 
of occupat ion. 
The instructions given by the French administration 
were couched in terms which become familiar by countless 
repetitions, long after charg~ d'affaires had been suc-
ceeded by ambassador. WDites bien a Berlin que noue de-
sirons la paix, et que K. Thiers, en particulier. est 
, 
deoide a' tout faire pour en assurer l'exeoution en ce 
qui concerne la France." (13) Already, the twenty-
eighth of June, a diplomatic diffioulty had arisen, and 
confronted th e Marquis de Gabriao on his first arrival 
(12) The choiee of Waldersee by Bismarck was notable,as tending 
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to give the mi ,sion a military rather than a diplomatIc charac-
ter. De Gahriao,on his side,hesitated with very real scruples 
befOre his acceptance, since the position could hardly be other 
than one full of bitterness,even to the most tactful of men. He 
himself declares (Souvenirs,p.llO) that he felt he was going Wto 
assist at the triumph and in the erection of an Jmpire buIlt upon 
the ruins of our influence in Europe. w Before leaving St.Petersburg 
he asked Gortchakoff's advice, and was urged by that elderly lover 
of phrases to go,since wone has rarely the occasion to render a 
veritable service to one's oountry." (Ibid"p.lll.) He received a 
in the German capitol. He was commissioned to ask ex-
planations for the didactic tone of the note addressed 
by Germany to France at the occasion of the reentry of 
the French troops into Paris. (14) De Gabriao secured 
satisfactory explanations, but he remarked ruefully; 
"It was clear that Germany was determined to demand 
without me roy all that the treaty of peace g.ave her a 
right to require of the vanquished." (15) It was the 
lesson Which he had to learn--which any French represen-
tative would have had to learn; that though diplomatic 
relations had been resumed, they were far from standing 
on a footing of equality. The lesson was brou~ht home 
to him rurther in his first interview with Bismarck, 
which did not take place until August twelfth. In the 
talk of the Chancellor at this time, were mentioned all 
the sources of discontent and bad feeling of the next 
few years. Bismarck was perfectly outspoken--as usual--
about his theory that France intended a war of revenge, 
and that this would better be sooner than later, fram 
the point of view of German advantage. Again, that the 
hint that his 80j ourn in Berlin would not be allowed to become 
too humiliating-~-a hint that it is hardly safe to accept un-
questioningly. See the discussion of Franco-Russian relations, 
Chapt er I. b elaR . 
(13) ..!l?!J!. p.121-2. 
(14) Waldersee had represented that the Grench government were 
exoeeding the effeotive force allowed for the period of occupa-
tion. 
(15) de Gabriac, OR. cit. p.146. 
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government of France was unstable, and that Germany 
could never be sure of any new goverrunent carrying out 
the terms of peace as concluded by Thiers. De Gabriac 
at this time began to carry out those instructions of 
his: he told Bismarck that Germany was not so logical 
as France, which had signed peace and was at peace, 
whereas the whole attitude of Germany remained warlike. 
Later, 1n a despatch, he analyzed the situation from a 
slightly different point of view from that which he at-
tempted to transmit to Bismarck. -Germany has nothing 
to expect from a new war. That which she has achieved, 
and which will not really be ended, as you (Thiers) s~ 
very justly, until after the evacuation of our territory, 
has given her the three things which she lacked: national 
unity, military supremacy, and the silver of our mil-
liards. She desires then, with reason, the conservation 
of peace, and her expressions of distruct toward us are 
an indication of the passion ith whiCh she desires it." 
We shall see that this reasonable and not unamiable 
view of German intentions changed gradually after the 
12 
Problems 
of 
Occupa-
tion. 
assumption of the post by the full ambassador, ~he 
Vicomte de Gontaut-Biron. He suoceeded de Gabriac on 
the fourth of January, 1872, ana with the formal estab-
liShment of Count Harry von Arnim as German ambassador 
at Paris. the two governments were placed on a normal 
footing, to ou~ward appearances. Yet through the two 
years up to the evacuation, Gontautts despatches are con-
atantly weighing the significance of insignificant 
things, are full of reports of the fluctuations of pub-
lic opinion, are wri~ten in a spirit of uneasiness and 
worry which contrasts powerfully with the arrogant tone 
of the report sent to Berlin by the German ambassaaor. (16) 
It was Thiera. far-seeing and prudent. who made to 
de Gabriac that remark quoted by the latter; The war will 
no~ be over until French territory is evacuated. This he 
had heard fram a Russian diplomat also. ana the truth of 
the s~atement is proven in a thousand incidents produc-
~ive of discord, arising out of the presenoe of German 
troops in the French departments. The problems of oc-
cupation may be groupea under five heads: I) The pardon 
(16) An in~eresting side light on the manner in which Bismarck 
dealt with diplomats is to be found in de Gabriacts Souvenirs, 
p.144-5. "----frankness. and even a certain broad sort of' 
language were tar from aispleasing him." Again, p.l52: "It was 
a mas~er, rather ~han a minis~er, whom I had before me." 
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and re1ease of French prisoners; II) the maintenanoe 
of the army; III) the tariff; IV) the payments; V)minor 
oomplications. The adjustment of these affairs goes on 
in the oorrespondence and in~erviews of Thiers, cease-
lessly active, of Remusat..- (17) of St.Vallier, (18) 
of Manteuffel. (19) and of the diplomatiC representa-
t1ves. 
The way in wnich the first of these problems was 
involved wi th the at'fort to maintain harmony during tne 
occupation, was pointed out in that speech of Bismarck's 
before the Reiohs~ag. of April tWenty-fourth, 1871. (20) 
So long as Frenchmen..- German prisoners of war, remained 
in custody. ill-feeling of the French pub,lie and press ,--
two powers of whicb we shall make frequent mention as 
this study proeeeds--eould not subside. On the other 
hand, it was to the interests 01' the German government, 
as we have seen, to keep the prisoners from reentry into 
the French army, thus hindering the building up of that 
body. De Gabriac, at his first opportunity after hie 
arrival in Berlin, represented to the Chanee!lor that 
t17) Foreign minister. 
(18) Commissioner Extraordinary of the general of the army 
of occupat ion. 
(19) General. 
(20) See above, page 5, note 4. 
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the for-mer---the fostering of ill-~ee11ng throughout 
France---was a more potent factor than the latter---
the reenforcement of the shattered army---from the 
viewpoint of disadvantage to Germany. It was a good 
argument: ~ou do not wish our army reconstituted, and 
filled with a spirit of hostility toward you, since it 
would increase your difficulties in case of war. If 
you will do what we ask, and be a litle lenient, it will 
aid in dispelling the danger of any war at all." Gontaut 
took up the sam~ strain when he succeeded de Gabriac, and 
Manteuffel's efforts were all directed toward the exten-
sion of the amnesty. But Bismarck delayed and delayed; 
the Ge rman government adopted the plan of granting amnesty 
little by little, with long intervals between favours. 
This necessitated a cons1aerable interchange of notes 
(21) in the matter, which, on the French side, are alter-
nately hopeful and discouraged in tone. Bismarck seized 
upon the pretext afforded h1mby the radicalism of some 
of the French j ournals s~ing that he could grant no 
complete favours while such a spirit prevailed. The 
(21) See Oco et Lib.#VI VII VIII IX X XI XV XLII LXII LXIII 
LXV LXVII LXIX LXXVI LXXVII LXXIX LXXII LXXIV XCViII. See 
also de Broglie, La Missi,9ne de M. Gontaut-Biron a Berlin 
p.l3. de Gabriac.pp.145,169; Pieces Justicat:lves. #G.p.31.9. 
15 
in.ju8t.ice of tJ}is was deer-ly felt by the government of 
a country where liberty of speech was a~ost a fetish; 
yet Thiel's himself realized the possib111t ,ies of this 
journalistic source of agitation, and wrote to his am-
bassador of the "idiocies" of the French press. It was 
not until the spring of 1872 that the amnesty was final-
ly' put into satisfactory operation. The fears of 
Bismarck as to the evil effects of the return of the 
prisoners do not seem to have been realized, but he had 
excellently suocp,eded in giving the chargJ d'affaires, 
the ambassador, the French government. the French people, 
and unquestionably the French prisoners, six months and 
more of worry and strain. 
The problem of maintenance of the German army of 
occupation was mainly in the hands of St. Vallier. His 
letters about arrangements show him to us a busy little 
man, of great conscientiousness, a ruling patriotism , 
much admiration for Thiers, and. as his troubles increase, 
an increasing melancholy. The point of friction in most 
cases was the horror of the inhabitants of lodging the 
16 
soldiers, and the dis1nc1inati_on of the latter to be 
lodged anywhere else but "chez habitants tl sinc e new 
barracks were often uncomfortable, in spite of all the 
efforts of St. Vallier to see that the engineers and 
builders did their work well. (22) Manteuffel was 1n 
general kindly enough disposed, but he did not abate 
for one instant his rigorous sense of what was fitting 
for Germans, and if he saw just cause, indulged in com-
plaint. Then would St. Vallier "move Heaven and earth It 
( 23) to remedy matters. As a whole, however, owing to 
the excellent disposition of these two, toward each 
other, there was less friction fram .this source than 
might have been ant iCipated, wh en the size of the army, 
and the recency of open hostilities, is considered. 
The tariff question was discussed in October, 1871. 
between Pouyer-Quertier and Bismarck; the French minis-
t er was able to report to his government: "We are in 
near accord." But it is not within the province of 
this paper to discuss the commercial aspects of the 
(22) See for example. Oco. et Lib.Cell,-in which St.Vallier 
is unoonsciously humorous 1n his anxieties. "As to the de-
partmental architect of the Vosges------l am going to find 
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the means of stimulating his activity; it is to threaten him with 
inflioting upon him publicly the responsibility for del~, 
of which he takes his share too easily,by making known,by the 
Voice of journals and advertisements, to the inhabitants of 
the three localities wh 3re the state of the works was not sat-
isfactory, that it is solely due to the delays of the architect 
that they owe those few d~s of military lodging with which 
they are threatened." 
(23) lbid.#CXO-CXCl . For insight into a few days of tensity 1n 
relations between the two countries. (24) The question of 
payments, also, ia rather a financial than a political 
pr<lJ.blem, and mB3' be omi.tted with the mere mention of 
the fact that it required some negotiating, and the 
inevitable interchange of notes to clear up misunder-
standings. (25) 
July, 18?l, when the German government gave the French 
to understand that the payments for daily maintenance 
would be expected for the entire army up to the last 
evacuation, even after a part of it had left the French 
department s, Bee Ibid.#XIV -XV'lII-XXI. 
(24) The question of reciprocity in Alssce Lorraine was 
most productive of difference of opinion. See Ibid. 
#XXXII XXXVIII XXXLX XL XLI XLlI XLIII. For the--agr'ee-
ment of October, 18?l, see Hertslet, State Papers~ 
Series 3, Vol. 62, pp.8?-93. See abOVe, page~. For an 
analysis of the situation leading up to the convention 
of October ,Bee de Gabriac, OPe .cit" pp. 160, ff. 
(25 ) For the financial aspec~s Bee Kathieu-Bodet, Le! 
Finances Fran9aisjts de l8?0 a 18?8~ lourna! Off)ciel, 
August 5 and 6, 1874, pp. 5657 ff, for a discussion of 
the 8ituation, led by M. Leon Say; Banker's Magazine, 
Effect of the French Jar IndtW)Jl.i!l; on ,germany... Gontaut, 
constantly fearful as he was of hostile intentions on 
Germany's part, feared trouble arising from delays or 
differences of opinion as to the mode of p~ent. 
That these hindrances were not more serious ia due to 
the policy of Thiers , and the promptitude with whioh 
the bankers of Europe took up the French debt. 
18 
The recurrent rise of that sort of happenings which 
may be olassified together as "minor complications." 
testified almost daily to the truth of Thiers' charac-
terization of the army of occupation as an inflammatory 
body in a wound. "France suffered from the sensation 
of being treated without consideration; needlessly hu-
miliated. The continuous concessions so wisely made 
by those who represented her, astonished her. Instead of 
the expected relaxat ion. a dull irritat ion was everywh ere 
felt. which the most painfUl moments of the war had not 
produced. The efforts made to restrain these sentiments, 
added t <ll) the ever present dangert-o of seeing them break 
out. and to the apprehensions that the German government 
had been able to develop in the French governm.ental 
circles." (26) Danger would have smouldered the more 
hotly, we can guess, had the general of the army of oc-
cupat ion been any other than a gentleman who could say 
of h~self as did Kanteuffel: "As for me, I was a stu-
dent in my youth of the history of France; I have read 
much------l know the French oharacter. Then after 
( 26 ) Han ot aux. .;::;C.;:o.:.::n-=tw;:.e;;.m~:.:.:::,.,--=F:..:r:.o::a::n:.;:c~e, Eng. T r ana • ..I, p. ~15 • 
See Appendix A. 
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having made the acquaintance of Your Excellence (Thiers) 
and of several members of your ministry~ I have come to 
the conclusion that that character is represented in 
the present government of France. and I have made my-
self a guaranty to my government of French loyalty. "(2?) 
Thiers in the first place was satisfied with the choice 
of Manteuffel as general, and wrote to him in a tone of 
the deepest sincerity that the accord between them 
should contribute to the general establ1sh,ment of pea-c8. 
(28) His hopes were to a great extent justified, for 
throughout the gradual readjustment Manteu,ffel' s influ-
ence was no inconsiderable factor. He was accused by 
the German public, and even by German offiCials, speak-
ing for Bismarck h~self, of being "trop fran~ais," and 
there was a t1me w~en the Chancellor kept him. in constant 
fear of losing his position. This was early in 1872. 
But Manteuffel's sincerity was indisputable. and after 
a visit to Berlin, and a talk full of mutual explanations 
and assurances. he was reconciled to the Chancellor, and 
the Chancellor to him. 
(2?) Ooc. :e~· L.ip. "IIrtlI. 
(28) Ibid. #III,rv~X. 
Thereby another danger for 
.. .. 
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France---that of his removal---was weathered. 
He was. of course, the more able to exercise his 
kindliness toward the French when no longer animated 
by the fear that every action of his would be misunder-
stood at headquarters. But even of him St. Vallier 
wrote: "-----the best of men have their faults, and the 
chief fault of M. Yanteuffel ia his excessive sensibil-
ity." (29) As this was aroused, at.Vallier was forced 
to explain, and on more than one 0 c casion to appeal 
to Thiers for a soothing word. The communication of a 
request of the French government in regard to the army, 
to Count von Waldersee instead of the general, was such 
a cause as would require St. Vallier's best efforts and 
most tactful explanations. 
Other troublesome incidents were the results ot 
feeling among the inhabitants of the departments, and 
the soldiers. The acquittal of two French citizens, 
murderers of a Prussian soldier, by the local French 
author! ties .. was perhaps the most alarming of these in-
Cidents, in its consequences. It resulted in the estab-
( 29 ) Ib id . #L. 
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lishment of a stat e of siege in the department. which 
the French people considered an excessive punisr~ent 
for the poor judgment of a petty French official. But 
the German pa.pers declared that the French government 
had proven ~tself inefficient to control'the passions 
of its peopoe; and that this was the view which Bismarck 
desired to have circulated. is shown by his despatch to 
Arnim uttering the same belief. 
The press again and again interfered With the 
smooth conduct of affairs. Now it was the utterly ir-
responsible excess of some French journal; now the 111-
temper of a. German paper which could not be said to be 
wholly independent of government influence. (30) The 
distinction is not without significance, since tt1mplies 
that French resentment of Germany's policy and utter-
anCes was more naturally kept alive than the German an-
noyance with France. 
Yet the cause for annoyance was far from being 
entirely restricted to the French side. as we learn 
from the series of despatches sent by Arntm, reportir~ 
(30) See below, Chapter IV. P.!38. 
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· the treatment which he, and his countrymen in general, 
received in Paris and throughout France. Social inoon-
venienoes, amounting sometimes to insults, were offered 
all Germans, in inverse proportion to their rank, and 
Arn1m was impotent to alter oonditions in the slightest 
degree. In reporting this state of affairs to the 
Chancellor. he made the pregnant comment that "'l'he 
actual, unvarnished reoognition of this situation is 
to ou..r_ i.D~ erest j . 1t and he indicated more than onoe that 
the bitterness 0 f the Frenoh people might be, in a sense, 
an advantage to Germany, sinoe if allowed to go un-
ohecked, it would attain suoh proportions that war 
would be inevitable; and this eventUality would better 
tace Germany sooner than later. Bismarck's reply to 
these complaints, hints, and subtle suggestions was 
matter of fact, as always, yet little less alarming for 
France. ·We have not desired war,· he wrote pompously, 
Wbut We are ready for it, as soon as new aggression from 
France make it necessary.-----The utteranoes of this or 
that French statesman are tmmaterial to us .. sinoe all 
N~goti8.­
tions for 
Shorten-
ing Term. 
pursue the same hostile end." (31) 
It is plain enoUgh, from these countless evidences 
(2)2) of difficult ies t- that the main effort of the French 
government must be to hasten the avacuation and shorten 
the period of occupation. By the peace treaties._ the 
peyments were to be completed by M~ 2, l8?4. But the 
astoundingly rapid recovery of France econanically, be-
ginning immediately after the cessation of the war. made 
possible Thiers' proposition to shorten the term. The 
obvious advantage to Germany in keeping her trDops in 
France. from the point of view of dominating over that 
country, made the German government hesitate about con-
cluding arrangements 01' the sort desired by the French. 
The consideration of advantage in the quick p~ent of 
the loan. however. finally prevailed. though not till 
after many weeks of del~ and objections, The negotia-
tions for shortening the term extended through June,18?3. 
up to the convention of June twenty-ninth; (33) and 
through the early spring of l8?3, before the convention 
of March fifteenth. (34) In the later of these negotia-
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t3l) Bismarck to Arnim,Feb.2,187B. Staatsar9hiv~28,15394.-
(32) For information as to the multiplied incidents which indi-
cate danger see Oec, et Lib. ,passim; the occasion of the great-
er number of notes Inthls correspondence being just such hanpen-
ings. See also the Arnim documents.Staatsarcniv,~and 28,H5~8?,8, 
5393,3.6.9,5400.Anhang enthaltend----- die verlesenen Dokumente. 
#48149. de Gabriac, op.cit. ,pp.1S9,l?4. (33) German text .. Staat sarchiv, Band 25, #5000. 
(34) See Repligue du Comte Harry d'Axntffi,passim.Occ. at ~1~. 
#CCXLIV to crecXXXI. Gontaut, Ope cjt.Chapter VIII. Convention, 
25, #5000. 
tions, Germany attempted to eat her cake and have it too, 
by permitting the payment previous to the time agreed 
upon, with corresponding evacuation, but with the reten-
tion of Eelfort. This last, as ~nim represented to the 
Chancellor .. would really be as excellent a guaranty as 
the presence of the entire army of occupation within the 
departments, since fran this vantage point the German 
troops could sweep down into France at need, ,and since 
dis~inct reservation was made of the righ~ of reentry 
in case of non-fulfi~ent by the French of the obliga-
tions of payment, or of violation of the provisions in 
reg.ard to French armament of the t err it ory evacuated. 
The SUbstitution of Verdun for B'elfort in the final. con-
vention, however it was accomplished, was the most favor-
able sign Which France had received since the Emperor 
Napoleon the Third declared the unhappy war. (35) 
One noteworthy feature of these negotiations, and 
particularly that of the spring of l8?3, was the part 
played by Gontaut, and still more, that played by Arnim. 
The former undoubtedly hindered the conclusion of the 
35)See Map, Appendix B. 
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earlier of the conventions for evacuation (June 29,l8?2) 
by his mistaken hesitation in seeing Bismarck personally, 
and by talking the matter over with other officials be-
fore interviewing the Chancellor. This was a mi.stake 
in judgment; Arnim's errors were those of intent. Al-
though the "Antwort"in which AEnjm embodied his defense 
attempts to represent him as wholly moved by patriotic 
impulses, it fails to be convincing. (36) Thiers, at 
least, and St. Vallier, imbibing Manteuffel's view as 
he did. were conscious of the duplicity of the ambassa-
dor, and in the measure that his position was complicated 
in Paris after these long-drawn-out discussions, the re-
lation of the two governments was complicated as well. 
The French cabinet had no means of knowing how far Arnim, 
in his wavering and uncertain policy was guided by in-
structions from Berlin; and on the other hand. the German 
Chancellor could not easily distinguish between the ac-
tual policies of the French administration, and Arnim's 
misrepresentations, even with the aid afforded him 
through St. Vallier's relations to Kanteuffel. 
(36) SSe Bibliography, Appendix A, Section B. 
26 
One other cause of delay was not only that conflict 
of German interest s themselves of which we have spoken 
(3'7) but an actual conflict of policies within the 
German official circle. Gontaut, who ~as at the heart of 
Germany, in spite of his lS)k of usefulness, made a keen 
analysis of the disunion between the military and polit-
ical p.art ies, as he called them. The former, led by 
Field Marshal von Moltke, and perhaps favoured by the 
Emperor himself, wished to retard the evacuat ion; while 
the latter, whoso opinions were formulated in the acts 
and words of the Chancellor, when unrestrained, recognized 
the danger of long occupation. Th~s disharmony, the am-
bassador thought, was a fruitful cause of the nerve-
racking delays and suspense. But Gontaut by no means 
excused Bismarck from al). culpab ility, since he thought 
also that Wall these delays, rumours, resistances, are 
tactics employed with the design of alarming and extract-
ing the best possible (result) from the negotiations." 
That the desired result was at length accomplished, 
and the agreement reached, is due to the tireless efforts 
(~7) Page 24 above. 
2'7 
of the little French president, of whom after the sign-
ing of the convention of March, 1873, the Assembly voted: 
"That he had deserved well of the country." Throughout 
he had continued politic, loyal, eloquent; with Gontaut-
Biron a bit reluctant; Kanteuffel eager, earnest, some-
t~es impatient, and alw~s pompous; St. Vallier har-
rassed and tense; Arnim evasive, self-seeking; the 
Emperor hardly cQmprehending the actual state of atfairs--
the Whole thought of the aged man centering upon war and 
peace ; behind all the rest, the penetration, the driving 
force. the inescapable will of Bismarck. In characteriz-
ing the necessary qualities of a minor official. St. 
Vallier inadvertently prescribed the disposition which 
any French negotiator found forced upon him: "That which 
, 
he ought to be, is a man modest,tranqu!l. having tact, 
and not seeking to create difficulties nor to exaggerate 
them." (38) 
The final agreement, reached after such prodigious 
effort, provided for the p~ent of the last milliard of 
the French indemnity during the summer of 1873, with 
(38) See Map, Appendix B. 
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evacuation of the last fOUT departments in proportion, 
and the retention of Verdun unti~ the tinal p~ent.(39) 
The tension was relieved so soon as the agreement was 
actually accomplished, and the last six months of the 
ocoupation were surprisingly quiet. The Frenoh govern-
ment ordered that no demonstrations should accompany the 
liberation of the territory, and the German troops 
marohed out in good order, and with some manifestations 
of humour, even, f r am the French peasants and townspeople. 
On the sixteenth of September, l8?3, the last German 
soldi er left Verdun. France was free. 
If the sum of all these difficulties, misunderstand-
ings, petty enmities, were the result only of the fact 
of occupation, normal conditions might have returned at 
once. It has surely been evident, even in so cursory 
a study as the foregoing, that they were but hints of a 
deep-rooted and enduring condition whjch had other causes 
than the hot temper of a German soldier, or the vanity of 
a German general. To discover what these conditions were, 
will be the purpose of the body of this paper. 
------------------------~------------~------------~p---(39) St. Vallier to Thiers, Occ, et Lib . #CLXXXIV. 
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Chapter One. 
Manoeuvres for Allianoes, 18?1-18?5. 
In vi~w of the antagonism whioh engendred the war. 
the antagonism engendred by the war, and the antagonism 
which the war left in its train, it seemed neoessary 
both for France and for Germany to make new and strong 
allianoes whioh should serve as a counter-weight, and 
in some sort a protection, against the hostility of the 
other country, It is obvious that France was in no po-
sition, for at least the two years immediately suoceed-
ing 18?l, to be a desirable ally. Germany's e~ity to-
wards her remained hardly oloaked under"peaceful rela-
tions", and while her own weakness was equally apparent 
she might seek in vain for partnership in any treaty on 
anything like fair terms, Germany then. had the advant-
age 1n this respect, and Bismarck did not let the oppor-
tunity slip. Since this was the time of his intense 
interest in the Kulturkampf. which was just attaining 
great proport ions, it 1 5 natural that one of his first 
oonsiderations should be CatholiCism, in its probable 
30 
Calholi-
clam and 
Alliance. 
effect on alliances. 
Whether he believed it himself or not, Bismarck 
gave utterance more than once to the fear of Ultramontane 
tendencies in France, bel'ore tie MacMahon government with 
its "white policy" came into power to justify any such 
fears. His line of argument was as follows: France 
sought a pretext for a war of revenge with Germany; an e 
hoped for conquest with the support of Oatholic Aqstria, 
and aided by the decrees of the Vatican Council. Ultra-
montane tendencies in Germany were favorable to the 
French policy, bu~ there was hope for Germany in the 
fact that Italy was unfavorable, any hope of France for 
"alliance With the latter being finally wrecked by the 
refusal of France to evacuate Rome." (1) Hence, the dom-
inance of any Catholic party in France, monarchist or 
republican, would have meant renewal of war. In such case 
there was alw~s the danger of th e Austro-French alliance 
mentioned above, and the sympatny of Catholic Germany. 
Russia, by joining such an alliance, could keep Germany 
in a state of dependence. (2) This, Bismarck says, was 
(1) Bismarck. ops, c,it., II, p. 92. 
( 2) Ib i d.. p. 185. 
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one cause of his displeasure with Arn~; he feared 
Arn~'s Ultramontane tendenoies, in spite of the am-
bassador's assertions that he ould do nothing that 
might be interpreted as conspiring with the Catholios. 
(3) Gontaut-Biron. also, was to be fearedj his int~aoy 
wl~h the Prussian royal family was great; though he 
mi ~t appear the most politic of men. there was no deny-
ing the fact that he was a Catholic, and by the end or 
1873 this had become enough to make Bismarck distrustful, 
ev n if open hostility must be reserved for ~owed 
Ultramontanes. The part pl~ed in the family of the 
emperir by Cexard, the French reader of the Empress, and 
a French secret agent, also distressed Bismarck. (4) 
It is evident that the aspect of a possible Catholic 
alliance which disturbed the German chanoellor was the 
fact that it would be Cathol Cj there his main preoccu-
pation lay. On the other hand. the ob~ect of Franoe was 
an allianc pri~arlly. In other words, the French fear 
was of Germany, as a power; the German tear, of Catholi-
cism as a per, which might, incidentally, be represented 
3 ArnLm to Bismarck. St~tsarcb'T, 28, 5~93. (4) Bl marck, 0 ci., II,p.188. 
32 
in France. Bismarck fUlly reoognized this difference 
in the situation of the two countries, and in his 
despatches to Arnim reiterates the point not only that 
there was danger i1' an "anti-German conspiracy fomented 
by the Ultramontanes of all countries," (5) but that this 
would act ually afford opportunities to France for gaining 
her end. Consequently the Kulturkampf took on a charac-
ter of international interest; Gontaut said of it: mwhat 
made this struggle against Catholicism especIally threat-
ening for European peace, was the effort of the Prince to 
draw the other powers into it, and unite them with him-
self." (6) 
In consequence of such a train of thought, Ultramon-
tanism and French hosti!1ty came to seem to a certain ex-
tent identical in the German mind. By the more unthink-
ing, the Papal attack of August, 1873, was confused with 
the French ~ttack of 1871, 88 a manifestation of the same 
policy. (7) France was put to it to deny, in response to 
the repeated inquiries of th y German ambassador, that 
"the French identified themselves with the Ultramontanes 
(5) London TimesLKay 13, 1875. .' 
(6) Gontaut-Biron, op,olt. ,p.429, Cf,Biemarck's despatch to 
Arnim. 14 May, l872;"the interest of every European country 
in future choice of Pope,whether the country mOficially rec-
ognizes the church, _ or has Catholic subjects. Concordat of the 
year makes interest essential. Can notgovernments come to un-
4erstanding? Schulthess Gesohiohts Kalendar, Vol.1874-5,p.266. (7) Cf. Annual Register, 1873, p.196. 
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beca.use t~ -there antioipa.ted allies" against Germany, 
(8) Thiers. with his gift for perceiving motives. wrote 
to Gontaut as early as March, 1872, that Bismarck feared 
this alliance. any allianoe, and that France must not 
think of allianoe until after evacuation; that she must 
religiously avoid even the appearance of intrigUe with 
the German Ultramontanes, and that the appearance muet 
accord with the real! ty. He was not blind to the element 
of danger 1~erent in Gontaut's temperament, and conclud-
.. ed with the injunction to the latter to keep out or 
Bismarck's quarrel with the Catholics. 
England t s 
Attit ude. 
The natural consequenoe to this thought of a possible 
Catholic alliance against Germany. 1s an inquiry into th e 
attitude of the non-Catholic powers, England and Russia. 
Of the two, England is the less important, because her 
policy of aloofness from Continental interests was con-
sistently mainta.ined. under Derby and Disrasl!. During 
the years 1871-5 such indications as England did give of 
interest in European affairs seemed to ehow that she was 
drifting away from sympathy with Germany, toward France. 
(8) Hohenlohe, op.cit .• II, p.161. 
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In February, 1871, indeed, "at the instance of the Duc 
de Broglie, Lord Granville and then Mr. Gladstone brought 
a pressure to bear on Germany to obtain from her the re-
duct ion of a biliion" in the amount of the indemnity. (9) 
The Duc de Broglie was a pot ent factor in determining th:iB 
attitude on the part of England; the French diplomat 
Gavard wrote in December, 1873; "I am struck by the 
strides which the Duc de Broglie has made here in public 
opinion." (10) A demonstration a little threatening for 
France, 1n an indireot w~, was the meeting of sympathy 
for Bismarck and the Kulturkampf, instigated by Lord 
John Russell, in January 1874. (11) But this, like most 
of Lord John Russell's projects at this time, was little 
more than a flash in the pan. and a. few months later 
English society, if no~ England offioially, gave a oon-
vinoing eVidenoe of interest in France, by the eagerness 
with whioh invitations to the ball of the Due de Bissaecia 
were sought after. This is a small thing in the fate of 
nations, but serves as a weathercock; Gavard said of it: 
"In spite of yourself, you can't help believing in the 
(9) Gavard, A Diplomat in London (see Bibliography.) p. 4. 
(10) ~. p. 160. 
(11) See the Times,for January of this year, 
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Russia's 
Attitude. 
existence of a country, when you are begging fa~ours of 
its official representatives." (12) 
Russia's attitude was a more tangible, as well as 
a more tmportant, matter. There Were two parties, or at 
least, if not quite so definitely, two factions in Russia 
during the war of 1870. "Imperial necessity" obviously, 
made official sympathy with Russia imperative; the rela-
tions between the Czar and his uncle, the Emperor William, 
were a matter of tradition, and not ephemeral in their 
promotion of good feeling. The neutrality of Russia, and 
her non-interference during the peace negotiations, in 
spite of Thiers' frantic journeys about the capitols of 
Europe, had stood Germany in good stead. In spite of 
these facts, there existed in France a general impression 
that popular feeling in Russia was not wholly in sympathy 
with the imperial policy, but leaned rather toward the 
protection of the vanquished country. This conviction, 
which betr~s itself in various w~s throughout the years 
up to 1875,(13) was born no doubt of France's great need 
of Russian benevolence, and the sanguine French tempera-
(l?) Gavard. OPt cit •• p.195. 
(13) For example, Le Flo's attempt to secure Russian pressure 
on Germany, in the spring of 1872, during the negotiations for 
the evacuation 6onvention of June 29, 1872. 
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ment; but also of such popular man.ifestations in Russia 
as de Gabriac describes; the contributdon of the people 
of Mo scow and St. Petersburg to a fund for French wounded, 
or his reception in Russian society, for example. (14) 
A rather more ~portant test~ony to Russia's absence of 
ill-feeling toward France, was in ~he tmmediate recogni-
tion of the Thiers government during the war. Had this 
been deferr ed, as Germany oould have wished, peace would 
have become difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate. 
Othe r powers. cons idering the peculiar position of 
Russ ia toward the combatants. would have been well-nigh 
forced to follow Russia's exa~ple. or rather her abstin-
ence from setting an example. 
The famous telegram of the Emperor to the Czar at 
the close of the war, thanking him for making German vic-
tory possible. and the answer of th e Czar, full of friend-
ly and more than friendly assurances. had natural.ly an 
aspect unfavourable to France, not only from the point of 
view of past events, but of the future. These telegr&~s 
were published two d~s after the preliminaries of peace 
(14) de Gahriac says of the Czar : "One saw that the continua-
tion of tha war impres sed him grievously, but that he neither 
would nor could intervene." This at first appears a contradic-
tion. but on second thought seems not irreconcilable, with the 
words of Prince Reuss (German ambassador to St. Petersburg) ttl'he 
Grand Duchess does not follow the fashion of complaining about 
the war; the Emperor. although he desires to see peace, pays no 
attention to these complaining women; "both realize" that we 
cannot break orf this struggle like a piece at the theatre." 
Anhang zu den Gedanken und Errlnerungen,II, #262. 
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were signed at Versa.illes. (Feb. 28,1871} The effect in 
St. Petersburg was not as good as the effect in Berlin, 
where rejoicing was naturally the rule. But in Russia, 
or that part of it which was reflected in the society of 
the capitol, there was a feeling that the Czar in this 
act might have lost to Russia the benefits of her neutral-
ity by involving her too definitely with Prussia, and 
even the Gennan party at court, felt "no unmixed satis-
faotion." Gortohakoff, the Frenoh representative having 
told him of his regret for the telegram, disavowed res-
ponsibility, and sent Thiers an extraordinarjly friendly 
letter; this again, was no very substantial support, in 
view of the neu~ral1ty of Russia. up to that time, during 
the days of crisis, but at least it was less dishearten-
ing to France than the publication of the telegr~s unex-
plained. (15) Gortchakoff also reported to de Gabriac 
that the Czar had just come to the point of resolving to 
address representat1uns to Versailles that peace must not 
be delayed on acoount of the question of payment in s1l-
ver----(16) had just oome to this pOint, when peace was 
(15) de Gabriao concludes his account of the matter, which 
oovers pages 99-104 of the Souvenirs,with the remark: WWe 
shall have for ourselves (nous aurons pour nous) the Russia 
of the future reign." Page 103, note. 
(16) See above, page 5, 
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announced! This was a non-commital statement enough, 
and might have been interpreted as favourable to Germany, 
as easily as to France,but the tone of Gortchakoff's 
communication made it of interest to the latter country 
particularly. A peculiarity of these slight indications 
that RUssia would not let France be too much harried. 
was that they all seamed to proceed from Gortchakoff 
personally. Gortchakoff's jealousy' of Bismarck was not 
in 1871 so well known as it later became, but in view 
of lat er events it is easy for us to see that the hope 
of Franae for Russian sympathy l~ in this very thing---
the personal element. 
Another such personal touch calculated to send the 
charge d'affaires to Berlin in l8?1 with a leaning toward 
Russia was the fact that the Czar, at Gortchakoff's in-
stigation. accorded an interView to de Gabriaa before his 
departure; an unusual diplomat 1c proceeding. 'l'he Czar 
appeared kindly disposed. and promised conversationally 
to say a good word for de Gabriaa and his cause. in 
Berlin; but, that this light assurance should not elate 
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the Frenohman unduly, conoluded the interview with the 
wiSh for peace and order in Frenoh internal affairs. (17) 
Bismarok with his diplomatic omniscience, could not 
have been blind to all these little straws in the wind. 
We get a glimpse at his estim.ate of the worth of the 
Russian Chancellor's inclinations, in a despatch to 
Arnim. of 1872. In this he assured Arnim that he need 
not be misled by the remarks of Remusat, nor the adula-
tion of the Frenoh press, into considering Orloff, the 
Russian representative just arrived in Paris, as a 
friend to France to the exclusion of other interests. 
"Treat him w1th ·full ·confidence as a trustworthy friend 
of Germany,~ the Chancellor urged. (18) 
The interview of the Austrian and German lrnlperors 
and ministers at Gastein and Salzburg in September,187l, 
which seemed to prelude allianoe between the two powers, 
in spite of Austria's natural antipathy toward a country 
which had inflicted upon her the defeats of 1866, could 
not fail to arouse, and to merit Russia's careful attsn-
tion. Austria's attitude during the war had been neces-
(17) de Gabriao, OPt cit •• pp.!13-115. 
(18) Sta&~sarchiv, 28, #5381. 
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sarily neutral, but she had given evidences of benevo-
.lence toward France, which led to German accusations of 
French sympathies~ injurious to the new Genman Empire. 
Gortchakoff was forced to represent in hiB official 
utterances that this meeting was satisfactory to Russia, 
since it was a step toward the guaranteeing of peace in 
central Europe. But an aspect which could not please 
Russia was, that the meeting was also "one step more 
toward the exclusive domination of Germany." (19) 
This was the significance of tha meeting for Franoe, 
as well as for Russia. If Austria and Germany, forgetful 
of old jealousies, and recognizing their common German 
interests, should come into a close alliance, it was a 
possible future prop cut out from under the feet of that 
unhappy country of the West. Such an outcome was not to 
be anticipated from the more or less personal character 
of the meeting of September, 1871, but this event argued 
a rapprochement which might pave the way for the alliance 
France had reason to dread. WHe neglects no effort to 
persuade Europe that the danger of seeing peace troubled 
(19) de Gabriac. OPt Cit., p.21? 
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can only come from France, and to show tha~ it is neces-
sary to be forearmed, against a power whose mor.al de-
pression as well as her preponderance, . are equal dange~ 
r or 1l.1.rope." (20) As a rna t tar 01· fact, the French foreign 
office was convinoed that there was nothing definitaly 
alanning to France in this series of interviews, but 
that it was cert.ainly inspired by Prussian distrllct 01' 
Franoe, and might be an indication of the polioy which 
Bismarck had marked out for himself. (21) More and more, 
then, Franoe came to look upon Russia as her only hope. 
It was a year lat er that the understanding known as 
ths "Allianoe of the 'l'hree Emperors" was consumma~ed at 
Berlin, to give France more pressing cause for alarm. In 
the summer 0 f 1872, a meeting of the Czar and the li}nperor 
Franois Joseph with the Emperor William in Berlin, was 
first projectsd. The occasion was to be the oelebration 
of the autumn manoeuvres of the German army. This meet-
ing was intended to have no politioal importanoe in tne 
eyes of the world, according to the German papers, but 
1n August the German Emperor was writing to Bismarck: 
(20) Ibid., p.209. 
(21) Ibid., pp. 214-217, passUn. 
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"An important poli ticAl .. ,event lies before us in Sept em-
ber---the meeting of the Emperor in Berlin; and public 
opinion looks upon it as favourably AS do you and I. I 
hope your health 'will allow you to be in Berlin. I will 
not commit myself to anything binding." (22) This hardly 
sounds as innocuous as the first reports of the project 
would have had it seem. But that Bismarck had no very 
definite ulterior motives is the inference from his 
answer to the Bmper~r: -I fear the activities of Prince 
Gortchakoff. since I read in the papers that he brings 
with him Jomini and Hamburger, both his secretaries. " 
(23 ) Tnis letter of Bismarck's was not intended tor 
publication, and hence was not written to divert the 
attention of the news-reading public fram any plane of 
his own. The Emperor was perfectly in sympathy with any 
plan which tended to confirm or maintain the friendly 
relations between Russia and Germany; hence it could not 
have been intended to ward off obj ection on the part ot 
the Emperor William himself. The only explanation is 
that Bismarok perhaps wished by this meeting rather to 
(22} Anhang ZU den Gad. u, Er. It #242. 
(23) Ibid l #243. 
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alarm France, and keep her in theahjeot state in which 
she was left in 1871, and from which by the fall of 1872 
she was beginning to recover (24 ) than actually to ac-
complish any binding agreement. He said many years 
later (25) that his or1ginal intention in regard to al-
liances, after the formation of the empire, was such a 
triple alliance as might have resulted from the Berlin 
meeting, with the addition of monarchical Italy, for 
the purpose of breaking up the "vicious circle" of gov-
ernmental development from "Social Republicanism to 
Caesarism." The possible motives of the three empires 
were not by any means identical, however, and Bismarck's 
recognition of the faot is perhaps the key to his hesi-
tations. He wished, apparently, to bring about a useful 
understanding, and at the same ttme. commit himself to 
little. Such a wish breathes through the letter to the 
Emperor above, and also through Bismarck's utterances to 
Lord Odo Russell during the Berlin meeting itself, ex-
pressing disgust with Gortchakoft in his white tie, and 
with his seoretaries brought along to "write something." 
(24) See abOVe, Introduotion, passim. 
(25) Bismarck. op. cit .• II, 251-252. 
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Bismarck saw that Germany's interest in such an alliance 
was the isolation of France; Russia's. a free hand in 
the East; Austria's, self-preservation. 
F~ce watched the meeting with the utmost atten-
tion, though her analytical ambassador recognized that 
in these differences in ultimate motives of the powers 
l~ hope for her. The full significance of the meeting 
for her was that the bonds of friendship between the 
three imperial countries were made the more effective 
to keep the differences from breaking out. Gontaut dur-
ing the stay of the two ~perors in Berlin had audiences 
with both of them, and their m~n1sters. His impressions 
at this ttme were rather more reassuring than might have 
been anticipated in Paris, for he had the friend~iest 
reception from both sovereigns, and a repetition from the 
Czar of what he had said to de Gabriac of Russia's good 
will toward France. The fear of French Republicanism, 
which Gontaut had so often to combat, was also introduced 
into the conversation, it is true, but in a manner rather 
friendly than threatening. After the departure of the 
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visitors Gontaut wrote as follows: "Russia and Austria 
think that France is necessary to Europe. They are of 
the opinion that France has sUi'fered sufficiently, an d 
they intend to aid her in the happy efforts which she is 
making to revive again, as testified by the eulogies 
given by Alexander and Francis Joseph, and by the Chan-
cellor of the Russian Empire, to the reorganization of 
our army. Russia and Austria wish then, a powerful 
France (?) and Germany a feeble one." (26) 
The general feeling among diplomats was that the 
. political ~portance of the meeting was slight. as it 
had turned out, and that its real significance was as a 
peace demonstration. Arnim wrote to Bismarck not long 
afterwards a despatch in which he speaks of the "fiasco" 
of the three Emperors' meeting. but Arn~, with his over-
subtlety, and his chronic annoyance with Bismarck, is not 
so good a witness that we must accept his interpretation, 
and implication that Bismarck did not accomplish all that 
he intended from the meeting. Funhermore. 88 newspaper 
opinion of the d~, in the midst of all the speculation 
(26) de'Bro~lie, La.llission de),{, de G,B. ,p.150. 
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and supposi~ion ,made olear, two things stand out; what-
ever else may have been projeoted or rejected: 1) That 
any guaranty of peace must necessarily be ephemeral; and 
2) that this meeting marked the official recognition of 
the new Germany by her imperial rivals---which could but 
be an indirect blow to France. (2?) 
This understanding, to give the result of the meet-
ing no more dignified name, was apparently confirmed by 
the series of Visits exchanged among the European mon-
archs 1n the course of the next year. (28) The visit of 
the German Emperor to St. Petersburg in April and Kay, 
1873, was heralded by the Provincial Correspondence as 
a confirmation of the good understanding of the previous 
year. Tne visit of the lDnperor to Vienna, in October, 
had the same effect. Indeed, as a German diplomat (29) 
confided to Gontaut-Diron, this meeting of monarchs and 
ministers had made a verbal agre~ent for union in case 
of a war from France. Gontaut, of course, following the 
line marked out for him, with which we are alrea~ fa-
miliar, remarked that this was a metter of indifference 
(2?) See Daily NewsJ London,for Sept. ?jAnnual Register,18?2; 
Gontaut, OPe cit •• pp.128-130, for reports of German press 
opinion. (28) See Bismarck, OPe cit., II,p.252; see above, Chap.I,note 
25. 
(29) Count von Redern. 
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since neither under the existing government, nor under 
a monarcnic form, would France exhibit any warlike in-
'tent1ons. 
What looked to contemporary observers like a new 
element in the European situation appeared in September, 
1873, when the king of Italy, Victor Emmanuel, made a 
visit to the mnperor William at Berlin. Bet·ore his com-
ing the lAnperor wrote to Bismarck: "If V'~ E.(sic.) should 
speak of a possible allianoe against France, I would in-
trench myself behind my principle to conclude alliances 
only ad ho cL " (30) The position of the king of I'taly at 
this ttme was an extremely difficult one, in view of the 
struggle over the te'1lporal power of the papacy, and this 
being the case, his natural ally was Bismarck. France, 
in the person of her president, had perceived this con-
sequence early in 1872, when the Kulturkampf was getting 
under way, and Thiers, speaking of the conformity o~ in-
terests of Germany and Italy, had counseled "seeing all 
and saying nothing." (31) At the time of the choice of 
Prince Hohenlohe as ambassador to the papal chair, 
(30) Anhang zu den Ged. u . ~r •• 1,#253,254. 
(31) Occ, et Lib.#XCI. 
48 
Bismarck had shown his realization of this French atti-
tude by writjng Arntm of the appointment as a new proof 
of the imperlal wish for peace with Rome. and .further-
more. as a weapon with which~nim might disarm French 
distrust. and fear of united action fram Germany and 
Italy. (32) 
Gontaut called the Visit of September .. 1873,. an 
"anti-French, anti-Catholic demonstration." (33) But 
he felt it less important than that of the preceding 
year, because of the lack of general partiCipation. 
That something tangible was the result, however. was 
testified in October. when Gontaut wrote to the foreign 
minister in regard to the proposed monarc~ical restora-
tion in France: "Count Laun~ (34) is polite, but ob-
viously hostile; since the visit of his king in Berlin, 
he makes upon me a certain impression of confidenoe of 
success which I did not earlier peroeive in him." (35) 
A few months later Bismarck himself gave utteranoe to 
a statement of the German position in relation to Italy, 
and in regard to Franoe, in answer to a despatch from 
(32) There is an interesting indioation of Bismarck's sincer-
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ity in wishing to avoid wrong interpretations of his relations 
with Italy in the inoident of his refusal to accept from the 
king a handsome present, which incident is related in the 
AJ.1tobiographY,II, p.l5l. "The great value of the present might---
cause it to be regarded as having some conneotion with the rap-
proachment wi th the German :mn~eror which the King of Italy at 
that time Bought and obtained. 
(33) Gontaut, OPa cit. pp.332-6. 
(34) Italian ambassador in Berlin. 
(35) Ibid., p.346 
o 
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direction; and the fact that the Emperor William himself 
had planned a trip to Italy and given it uP. seemed to 
lend color to the theory, which Decazes also shared. In 
October, 1875, how~ver, the postponed trip took place, 
and though a speech from the throne is often colored, and 
must of necessity be colored by the wish to make a cer-
tain definite impression. it is worth While to note the 
following quotation from the speech of October 27, l87b, 
as much to illustrate the desires of the German govern-
ment~ and the direction of its policy, as the aotual 
st.ate of a:rfalrs. ----- .. -the v Isit from which his Maj esty 
the Emperor is just returning, and the hearty reception 
whicn he has reoeived fram His MaJesty the King of Italy, 
and fram the whole people, testifies to the conviction 
that the inner unity and mutual friendsnlp to which 
Germany and Italy are mutually oommitted, offers a new 
and lasting guaranty for the peaceful forwara progress 
of Europe.- (38) Here then is another danger, another 
pitfall, which France must avoid if her rspeat.ed assur-
ances of her intention to keep the peace are worth 
(38) Staatsarchiv, 29. #5539. 
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anything . 
Her complete isolation seems to be outlined in the 
words of the Czar of the Russias. in the winter of 1874, 
at the time of a visit to St. Petersburg of the Emperor 
Francis Joseph. The Czar at this festive occasion ~ve 
the following toast: ~I drink to the health of my friend 
the Emperor Francis Joseph whom we are so glad to see 
among us. In the friendship whioh binds us, as well as 
the Emperor William and Queen Victoria together, I see 
the surest guaranty for that peaoe in Europe which is so 
desired by all, and so necessary for all." (39) 
England's ~omment on this as uttered by the Times, 
was to the effect that "England accepts the quadruple 
a l liance thus indicated" so far as she is concerned in 
averting war; but that she will share no host'ile intent 
against France. (40) The Czar himself', through Gortcha-
koff, later assured the French ambassador to Berlin that 
England had quite mistaken the import of the toast. and 
read into it implications which it did not in the least 
contain. Decazes before this wrote to Gontaut that 
(39 ) See the Times for Feb.17, 1874. 
(40) Ibid. 
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perhaps the toast did not altogether please Bismarck, as 
seem.ing to indicate more independenoe than he liked in 
his allies, but that Bismarck "ell knew that "he holds 
A~stria in the hollow of his hand through the fear which 
influences her, and RUssia through the adherence and es-
teem. of the Czar for the Emperor William." (41) 
In 1874, however, in spite of this net in which 
France appeared to be caught, the natural inclination of 
Russia toward Fr~ce, aside from the imperi.a~ poliCY, 
again began to seem a loophole of escape. (42) it was 
too dangerous for Russia that a powerful state such as 
Germany should exist without check in Central Europe, for 
Russia to watch with equanimity the entire subduing of 
France. Bismarck recognized this in his comment: "That 
for the Russian policy there is a limit beyond which the 
importance of France in Europe must not be decreased, is 
explicable. That limit was reached, I believe, at the 
Peace of Frankfort---a fact which in 1870 and l8?1 was 
not so clearly recognized in St. Petersburg as fiVe years 
later." (43) So remote an observer as Gavard, in London, 
(41) Gontaut, on, cit. II, p.4l? (42) A distinction which we have pointed out abOVe, page 36, 
(43) Bismarck, Ope cit. II, p.253. 
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upon the occasion of Schouva10ff's (44) visit to that 
city in the autumn of 18'74, wrote that "He acts as if' he 
were bent more than any other one thing on emancipating 
himself from any lurking kindness for Germany and the 
Germans." And again, Gavard quotes a remark of Schouval-
off in conversation: wGermany is not so strong as before 
the war, and her unity is at the mercy of Russia, since 
she must keep large forc es in the West under the present 
state of things," (45) Schouvaloff, however. was a diplo-
mat, with all the qualities popularly conceiVed as be-
longing to this profession. and would be no trustworthy 
witness to Russian teeling had we no other evidence than 
his words. In 1873-4, during the alarm caused by the i1l-
judged utterances of the ~rench bishops (46) Lefl$ had 
found Gortchakoff willing as usual to make assurances, 
and as usual, to take no steps, Following this. Gontaut 
himself went to St. Petersburg in March, 18'74. (47) He 
there saw Gortchakoff, had audience with the Czar, many 
conversations with ~om1ni. Gortchakoff's tru9ted secre-
tary and confidant, and with many others in high places. 
(44) At that t 1me in London on a '''mission extraordinaire." 
After 1875, ambassador to England. Always personally in 
accord with Bismarck. 
(45) Gavard Opt ci~" page 203. 
(46) See below .i Cha.pter I IJ . 
(4'7) See Gontaut. op. cit. Part II, pp t 403-15. 
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The Grand Duchess Marie, for example, expressed her 
sympathy for all things French in such a manner as t o  
make us suspect that one reason for the popular Russian 
goodwill toward the conquered country was its fashion-
ableness. The general sense of these interviews was con-
fil'matory of those which we have noted above, and which 
took place during the two first years af'ter the war. But 
succeeding the meeting of the three Emperors by a year 
or more, during which this agreement was ostensibly the 
balance wheel of the continent.it is the more remarkable 
that Gortchakoff not only assured Gontaut of Russia's 
usual good Wishes, but remarked that Bismarck constantly 
sought to prepare difficulties for France, which France 
must with patience avoid. The affair of the pastoral 
letters, for example; though this Gortchakoff refused to 
take seriously, and even went so far as to say: "Bismarck 
would not declare war upon you. The moral opinion of 
Europe is against it." So much was encouragdng for 
France, but Gontaut was not allowed to come away from 
any such friendly exchange of opinion without the note 
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of deprecation for the instability of the French govern-
ment, and for possible French clericalism, being sounded 
in his ears. As the French diplomat summed up the im-
pressions of his visit: (A~ Russia was temperamentally 
in sumpathy with France and in antipathy to Germany; the 
relationship between the Czar and his uncle. the Germ.an 
Emperor, being the only effective bond to keep Germany 
and RUssia irl accord. (:S) Russia would evidence this 
predilection ,of hers in spite of her apparent understand-
ing with the German Empire, in case Germany should go too 
far in aggression. (This fram Gortchakoff; was he empow-
ered to say as much?) (C) But France must bolster up he r 
shakiness of governmental structure, on the one hand, and 
. on the other, avoid the pitfalls of Clericalism. 
In the later part of this year (1874) a Times 
article, always an excellent register of opinion, assert-
ed that a Franco-Russian alliance was surely being fore-
shadowed in the course of European diplomacy. What this 
meant . to France, and the eagerness with which she must 
seize on any such indications, has alrea~ been pOinted 
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out. Deoazes, almost alw~s olear-Righted and not self-
deceiving, wrote in 1875 to a confidant: "I continue to 
relY 'upon El1gland less than upon Russia." 
What did this stirring beneath the surface of thl~s 
mean for Germany? On the second of May, 1874, Bismarck 
wrote to Hohenlohe. that Germany's interest was to keep 
the peace between Russia and Austria, sinoe in case of 
war between them she would have to choose, "und das sei 
schlimm." (48) But undoubtedly in the back of the Chan-
cellor t s min d exist ed that train of reasoning which ul-
timately fathered the Triple Alliance; as the choice of 
France must be Russia, so the choice of Germany must 
be Austria. Germany and France can never be ranged on 
the same side of the line. 
(48) Hohenlohe,' Ope cit •• II, p.119. 
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Chapter Two. 
Germany and the French Part ies. 
18'71-18'75. 
In th e fall of 18'7~. when our period begins, the 
problem of the relatIon of Germany to the French inter-
nal affairs, is the problem of adjustment to the Yac-
Mahon government. In order to understand this situa-
( 
tion, it is necessary to review the events, and influ-
ences of Germany on the French parties, from the time 
of the war of 1810. 
At the time of the outbreak of the Commune, there 
was serious consideration, both in Berlin and St. 
Petersburg, of a plan for German troops to march into 
Paris, and put down the uprising which was apparently 
having its own way, in spite of the efforts of the 
French troops. (1) Yet later argument has been adduced 
to prove that Bismarck in reality aided the Commune, in 
a policy on his part of hindrance to French recovery_ 
The evidence for thia is found in the forbearance of the 
German government with the administration of the Commune, 
(1) de Gabriac, OPe cit •• p.l06-8. 
\ 
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the facility with whioh the insurgents obtained weapons; 
and such indioations, quick to rouse suspicion in the 
alert French mind. M. JUles Favre has discussed the 
qUestion, and absolved Germany from suspioion, basing 
his argument on his knowledge of the general policy 
of Germany, and her treatment of France during the re-
mainder of that time in which he had such intimate share. 
It seems to the writer that in view of the sentiments of 
the Emperor in regard to radicalism, and the general 
feeling of the French people, ~ismarck could hardly have 
engineered a policy of this nature, even with his master-
ly ability at manipulation. He himself was no friend of 
radicalism. though abstract principle had little Weight, 
it is true, when it came to a question of more or less 
adVantage • . ~ut the advantage itself is questionable; 
whether it would be worth while tor Germany to· keep 
France not only weak but wholly impotent, when the former 
had nothing to gain from further campaigns, and had every -
thing to lose if the indemnity were not paid. (2) As St. 
Vallier said in another connection. ~ismarck knew well 
(2) Hanotauz has discussed this question,but states no def-
inite conclusion. OPt cit. It p.278 ff. 
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how to take oooasion to ~la~ Franoe. whether he really 
had any ulterior intentions or not. The oonolusion 
then. seems to be, that he was not unwilling Franoe 
should think he might foster oivil war, on the one hand, 
and on the other, that he did not desire disorder and 
disorganization to go too far. and get beyond his pos-
sible oontrol. 
The Rivet Law of August thirty-first. l8?1. giving 
to Thiers the title of president of the French republic, 
was greeted by Manteuffel as that very security for the 
p~ent of the debt, which was desirable for Germany. 
(3) Manteuffel, to be sure, whom we have seen accused 
of being "trop franvais". is no very good representative 
of German governmental opinion. but as a matter of fact, 
here all Germans---save the remarkab~e Arnim---seem to 
have been agreed: that Thiers' government was a guaranty 
for Germany. Thiers own feeling of his function in 
French development has been mentioned; that he wished to 
liberate France from the Prussian army. and bring about 
the beginning of that economic development which he felt 
(3) Occ. et Lib. #XXXI. 
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must come about to redeem her---agricultural, as well as 
commercial and financial. It is of interest to note here 
the words of the radical leader in this connection:"The 
monarchists designs will miRcarry. M.Thlers will end 
either by forcing them to capitulate or by dissolving 
them.. Meanwhile he keeps them busy with one hand twhile 
with the other he pays the Prussians, shortens the period 
of occupation---that is to say, hastens the hour of dis-
solution. for which at the bottom of his heart he 
longs -------." (4) 
This same radical leader, as we know, was held up 
before France 1n the person of her diplomats, as Germany~ 
great horror, and consequent ly, inversely, France t great '-
est danger. lHsll'l..arck argued that the first act of a 
radical government would be a declarat ion of war against 
Germany; a war of revenge; that this must be so, because 
of the great need which such a government would have, to 
unite factions in common interest, and avoid civil strug-
gle. (5) The utterances of the radicals, and even of 
Gambetta himself t were claimed by the Germans as caURe 
; s 
(4)Letter from Gambetta to his father;Dec.29,l8?2. Cheusl, 
Gambetta. Life and Le~rs. trans. V.M.Montagu,p.3l4.Cr.Thiers: 
I lImit my political task to what I have called the reorgani-
zation of France and I have to begin with, brought in peace 
the establisnment of order,the equilibrium of fInances,and the 
reconstitutIon of ~h~_a~ destroyed by the failure of the Em-
plre. Ooc. et Lib.~III. (5) See for example Dontaut 1 o~.Cit. ,p.233 on:~enn je Thiers 
sterben sollte--und Gott verha e aas, denn wir wdnscnen ihm 
aufrlchtig ein langer Leben----so wdrde Gsmbetta ana Ruder 
kammen, und vierzenn Tage naohher hAtten wir ein Revanche-
krieg." Gontaut quotes this from Bismarck. 
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for alarm. In 1872 Gambetta took a vacation journey 
through the provinces, and was received in a manner 
which astonished all who had believed him out of the 
reckoning. Arnim. reporting the atate 6f opinion to 
Bismarck, wrote that the peasants were more radical 
than Paris. (6) Gambetta declared for the reconstitu-
tion of the army, as the only institution which "can 
restore to the Fatherland its separated children." 
SUch sentiments as these, the German government could 
hardly be blamed for resenting. provided there were any 
weight attached to them, or that they deserved to be 
considered weighty. This it was the policy of the 
French government repeatedly to deny. Gambetta's opinion 
of Thiers has been quoted; it is equally useful to quote 
Thiers on Gambetta:"Eh bien, be persuaded that M.Gambetta, 
unless he changes and becomes a conservative of my spe-
cies (!) has no chance to succeed me. My health is good, 
my relations with the Assembly better than they ever 
were, and unless an accident happens to my life or my 
presidency, M. Gambetta will not succeed me!" (7) 
(6) Which may be explicable by the fact that they had not 
seen the horrors of the Commune enacted before their eyes. 
The reference is to a letter from Arnim to Bimr~rck. May 6, 
1872; Staataarchiv, 28, #5383. 
(7) Oco. et Lib. iccxx. 
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Needless to say, the German governmen t required mo l.'e 
substantial proof than mere assertion of conviction, 
to give up its fears; that is to say, that Bismarck 
required that Germany have proof! This proof. so far 
as the French gover.r~ent could offer it, was in the 
form of reference to the natural conservatism of the 
French mind. with the example of the Commune before 
it, and secondly, to the overwhelming need and desire 
of the French people for peace. This last point.which 
was most emphasized in every answer to German suspicion, 
justifies by implication Bismarckts claim that a rad-
ical government would mean immediate war with Germany. 
In spite of this, for good measure. Gontaut was fond of 
telling him, or officials of his staff through whom the 
statement would penetrate to him, that there was no dan-
ger of war of revenge from any party whatsoever, so uni-
versal was the French desire for peace. 
The complex question of Germany and the Bonapart-
ists can never be solved save by inference from the ma-
terial available at the present time. There are two 
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aspects of this question to be considered: French sen-
timent, and GerltJan expressions. After the Commune, and 
the establishment of the Third Republic, the suspicion 
arose in French political circles that Germany was un-
dermining the Thiers government by maintaining extraor-
dinary relations with the Bonapartist faction. Although 
France in her humiliation was never in a position to de-
mand a direct explanation, her fears were not unknown to 
the German administration, and Manteuffel. characteristic-
ally, (8) expressed to the French commissionaire his re-
gret at such an interpretation of German interest in 
France. The remarks of the Bonapartists themselves gave 
color to the idea, however, for this party, although de-
claring that they made no efforts to overturn the republic 
so long as Thiers was in p~Ner,-----which really meant so 
long as the Germans remained in the Eastern departments---
nevertheless boasted of Gern:an sympathy. They made a part 
of their program reconciliation, in the fullest sense, 
with the victorious country. 
(8) Occ. et Lib./LxV. 
64 
That the "German sympathy" so far as any tangible 
proofs of it went, was more or less a figment of the 
Bonapartist imagination may be inferred from the series 
of despatches which Aa:nim wrote, and the answers which 
he received, on this topic. AZnim himself took the at-
ti tude that the Bonapartist was the elemen t which, once 
in power, would be most favourable to Germany. He as-
serted, furthermore, trat public sentiment in France was 
such t hat any appeal to the country in case of Thiers' 
fall would result in an Imperialist victory; and that 
hence, it behoves Bismarck to get into touch with this 
p art~ . It would even be well to use German influence 
to hasten the next revolution, so that it might take 
place while German troops were still in France, and 
Germany, consequently, master of any turbulent situa-
tion in the occupied country. He spoke cryptically of 
the "advances" made by the Bonapartists, and advised 
meeting them half-way. (9) The Cr~n ce l lor's responses 
were noncommittal. He recognized that the Bonapartists 
in power would have advantages for Ger.many, but repeat-
(9) staatsarchi v, 28, #5385. 
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edly made the point in his orders to Arnim that the task 
of Germany in 1872 as the support of the contemporary 
regime in France----for the sake of the indemnity, of 
course----which regime ould but be eakened by any def-
inite favour shown an orpo ition Farty. Later in the 
same ear, he reprimanded Arnim severely for his rumoured 
acorn of the Thiers govornment, and l)rophec of the rise 
of Prince aroleon to porer. Arnim denied the allegation 
of antagonizing the existing gover.runent, but continued 
to insist that Ge any would do ell to -take step 
to ard securing her dominion v r the art 
almost certainly take in hand t 
course of a ear or t o. (10) 
F 0 the e d other eTldences, 
Bis rcy 's st nt to nlohe, in 
B art ts ou! he be t 0 ru1 
th 0 of h con 
d hat they r !%luch 1e 
the Or1eanist (11); or Gont 
t t the gen ral nti n of h Ge 
10,11, 1n 
o • ci t. II 11 
187 , 
8, 
d 
hich ould 
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favourable to the Imperial party, it is plain that the 
fOllowers of Prince Napoleon had at least the sanction 
of a cordial German feeling. As to the actual steps 
taken under Bismarck's guidance to manifest this favour, 
the just inference from the testimony before us seems 
to be: (A) That the Bonapartists did make advances to 
the Ger.man government, probably encouraged by the atti-
tude of Arnim; (B) that the French publiC, as well as the 
administration, was convinced of the existence of this 
undercurren t ; but (C) could not gauge German response; 
(D) that Bismarck as his usual policy was, took little 
trouble to disabuse the French mind of this fear. recog-
nizing its possible usefulness to him; but (E) that he 
made no actual step in response to any such overtures, 
even though the general tendency of German feeling was 
toward sympathy with the -Bonapartists. 
But Radicals and Bonapartists, important as their 
relations with Germany might be for the existing gov-
ernment, were only parties of the future---and a wholly 
problematic future. The position of Germany in the 
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struggle between Thiers and the Monarchists, which ulti-
mately resulted in th e fall of the "bourgeois pt"esident", 
was the immediate problem of 1872 and early 1873 . The 
German belief in Thiers' good faith, was indubitable, 
this has been sufficiently illustrated above so that it 
is unnecessary to quote at length from any of the number-
less remarks of Bismarck or of Manteuffel on thi s point. 
Even the German Emperor was rumoured to have declared 
himself not only satisfied with the policy of the govern-
ment, but under the spell of the president's personality. 
Thiers' own words, in the famous speech of December, 
1872, illumine the situation. He said: "Le pays est 
sage; les parties ne le sont pas. It The folly of those 
parties which opposed him so bitterly, before the period 
of ocoupation was over, the country liberated, his work 
done, is almost unbelievable. If ever there were a time 
when party spirit needed to be subordinated to one great 
national purpose, these critical. years were such a time 
for France. And yet, the intense conviction of the var-
ious monarchist parties that they were right, and Thiers 
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wholly wrong, must be taken into account. The root of 
their opposition to him was not wholly, nor even pre-
dominantly mere lust of power, but a fundamental differ-
ence of principle. Bismarck was not alone in pointing out 
the "vicious circle" of republicanism to radicalism, nor 
Atnim alone in his notion that Thiers' policy was rapidly 
approaching dependence on Gambetta. The monarchists with-
in France itself were animated by the same horror of red 
republicanism,an4 doubtless felt that though they could 
not appeal to the country in bringing about a dissolu-
tion, until Thiers' peculiar work was ended, that still 
in opposing him, they might keep a check upon his exces-
sively republican tendencies l (12) The struggle came to 
a crisis in the fall of 1872, when Thiers threw down the 
gauntlet in his memoralle speech of the thirteenth of 
November, declaring for the immediate adoption of repub-
lican institutions. The ef~ct of this speech was to 
put the monarchists in a most embarrassing situation. 
They could but oppose its implications with all their 
might and main, and yet Thters in the pTeviouB session 
12 See Hanotaux, Ope cit.,I,p.485, for a suggesti e analysis 
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of the session of April to August,1872,which clearly indicates 
the limits of Thiers' achievements. His three great services 
of this session were: the passage of the army bill; the con-
vention for evacuation· and the liberation loan. But in a t~r­
iff discus sicn,which h~d not the weight of necessity of prob~~- d 
tion against Germany, as had these other measures, he was 0 ge 
to yield. 
had held up before their eyes his threat of resignation, 
to good result. In the words ,of de Broglie, that con-
sistent critio of the president: "What moment could be 
less convenient for that outbreak, whioh must come soon-
er Or later? Did Thiers think he could pass thus easily 
from. all the promises that bound him?" (13) The minis-
terial crisis that followed was not unnoticed in Germany. 
Gontaut, not without yielding to the temptation to 
hold up before the eyes of his readers the base inten-
tions of which he had come to suspect Germany, had re-
corded carefully his impressions of the German attitude 
of the time. The first point which stood out to the 
European mind, Was Thiers' assertion that "The Tricolor 
will make i t s way through the world." This did not have 
the conservative sound which Gontaut wished to persuade 
Europe, and especially Gortchakoff, that the speech was 
meant to convey. Gortchakoff was conferring with the 
German Emperor at the time, and" hence Gontaut had the 
opportunity of conversation with him. We have already 
seen that France was desirous of Russia's friendship, 
(13) ae Broglie, Ope cit~, pp.58-9. 
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and that Rus sia, though not unfavourable, looked as-
kance u~on anything but a wise conservatism in govern-
mental policy. It was nece6sar,y, then, for Gontaut to 
represent the speech to the Russian Chancellor as giv-
ing no cause for alarm on the score of radicalism. The 
reaction of German public opinion was not quite that of 
Gortchakoff. To the German mind, the main thing re-
mained the continuance of Thiers in office. In conversa-
tions with Count Redern, with von Balan, (14) and others, 
Gontaut learned of the importance attached to this by 
the Germans. The sentiment was echoed in the press, 
although the Spenersche ~eitung,which was generally re-
garded as being in close touch with official sources of 
information, came out with an article which Gontaut 
characterized as being friendly neither to FrBnce in 
general nor to Thiers. The complaint made in this jour-
nal was based on the really unanswerable question:"What 
can be expected of a country in which one crisis follows 
another, in never-ending succession?M The difference in 
the situation of the two countries in respect to one 
(14) Secretary of the German Foreign Office. 
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another is very clearly evidenced in (A) the effect of 
this crisis in Germany, no German official hesitating 
to express his opinion; and (B) the attitude of complete 
reserve adopted by Gontaut and counseled by Thiers (15) 
during the ministerial crisis in Ge:rmany in the next 
month: (16) 
To the progress of the Thiers government, against 
the odds mentioned above, was opposed one peculiarly 
complicating element. This waS the hostile bearing of 
Arnim toward Thiers, whether recognized or not by the 
latter. Mention has been made of the counsels of Arnim 
in the matter of advances to the Bonapartists; and of his 
assertions that the Thiers government was on no sure 
foundation. and was no certain guaranty for Germany. 
The constancy with which he emphasizes this in his des-
patches shows a state of mind which could not help be-
traying itself in his conduct, in spite of the general 
Ge~~ policy of supporting Thiers. As early as June, 
1872, before the final signature of the evacuation con-
vention of that month, Bismarck wrote to Arnim inquiring 
TI5T Occ:-etLib. jfCCXLIV-V. . ' • 
G(16) Gontaut I'S discussion of th~tcrpiSit8 land Ch-!;pS t:~f~ii ~~ssim. ermany is to be found in o~. C1. ax , , tre He may be convicted, I thin ,of tne wish to hold up before 
administration in his despatches, the extreme danger of ot i 
thorough-going'republicaniaro. H~ himak8elf,g~ec~~~~e ~~rn~ tha~ s~patny with the republicans. r-e rn es m t The German ~rope feared them, than maiiS jUistifiiedpo~~rt~!rf~~~eighed any 
lnsistence upon Thlers re n ng n 
theoretical fear of republican institutions. 
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about a rumour that Arnim had remarked on Germany's dis-
favour toward the continuance of the Thiers government. 
It was only a few months later that he wrote again to 
precisely the same effect (17) and after the French in-
ternal crisis of 1872, the matter attained the dimen-
sions of a controversy between then. Manteuffel contrib-
uted to Bismarck's knowledge of Amim's duplicity by re-
porting a conversation of Atnim with St. Vallier. The 
former had suggested that the Thiers government was con-
sidered "untenable" because it was sure to revert to 
Gambetta's control. This, said Manteuffel, struck him as 
an utterly unexpected blow, since ha had been acting on 
the understanding t hat the German government demanded the 
strengthening of the existing order. While Manteuffel 
was reporting thus to his home government, it is apparent 
that he could hardly have been concealing from st. Vallier 
his surprise, and distruct of Arnim, And indeed, his 
hatred of the ambassador betrayed itself in a hundred 
~ays, in a hundred sayingB~ evtn in warnings to st. 
Vallier. Through st. Vallier, of course, this penetrated 
(17) Sohulthess, Ge:s'chichtskalenda::r, Ed. i5, p.253. June 18, 
1872, the earlier despatch; ~.p. 254, Nov. 8, 1872, the 
later. 
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to Versailles. Thus there came - into existence, especial-
ly after the negotiations of the spring of 1873, a wide-
spread distrust of Arn1m, which Was all the more alar.m-
ing to France because Of its very vagueness. Even 
Manteuffel misunderstood Amim's game, for he continually 
represented him as the "creature of Bismat'ck". Whatever 
that somewhat inexplicable diplomat was, he was certain-
ly not that ! The French knew only that he was unfriendly, 
and that he had come to them with a preconceived notion 
of French bitterness toward Germany. (18) They had little 
means of judging how tar he was inspired by his govern-
ment, in this attitude of his, and it was certainly not 
until after the negotiations of the spring (1873) that 
the breach between him and the Chancellor became known. 
And on the other hand, France was misrepresented to 
Bismarck by his reports, if not in his insistenoe upon 
the hostility of the Frenoh people, surely in his fail-
ure to report accurately during the difficult months 
before March 15, 1873. Hence, his presence in Paris 
was a fruitful source of discord. He finally reaohed 
See St. allier to Thiers, Occ. et Lib., LXI. 
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the length of exceeding his diplomatic function bv rec-.. 
o~~ending to the Emperor direct his policy in regard to 
Thiers, representing, as he always did, that it was de-
sirable for the inevitable change of government to take 
plaoe while German troops were still in France. His 
bitterness towards the president of the republio was 
exemplified in a desp atch of 1872, in whi ch after a 
speech of Thiers which proved to be of no decisive im-
portance, he wrote that the orator: "has given a new 
proof of his inability to rule himself and others."(19) 
The source of Arnim's bitterness, and the causes of his 
adoption of this polic.y, in exact opposition to that ex-
pected of him by the government to which he was respon-
sible, are far from clear. Bismarck ascribed his ac-
tions to a lack of political foresight, and a fatuous 
be~:f that his policy was plausible. Again, Bismarck 
pointed to Arnim's vanity, making him desirous of seeing 
his own ideas in operation, and Bismarck's refuted. In 
the "Reply" which he made to Bismarck's accusations, in 
1876, he said little of the matter, implying, indeed, 
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that his relations with Thiers were of the best, whereas, 
from his letters of the time, we know the contrary to be 
t rue. Bismarck later asserted that Arnim ', s influence 
was largely responsible for the fall of Thiers on May 24, 
1873, so soon after the convention for liberation, and 
before it had been carried out. (20) It was supposed that 
Arnim, on the evening when the news came, was at dinner 
with ,"prominent Orleanists", and received the announce-
ment with every sign of rejoicing. This is further con-
fir.med by the remark of Decazes, made at the time, that 
it was a peculiarity of Bismarck's complaint of Arnim's 
complicity, that the Legitimists always considered Arnim 
their opponent. This was of course compatible with his 
having congratulated the Orleanists, but quite incompat-
ible with his having advocated to Bismarck an agree~ent 
with the Bonapartists, if he was sinoere in the latter 
aotion. But at least, whether he was directly implicated 
or not, his influence had weakened the faith of the oppo-
sition in Monsieur Thiers as wholly satisfactory to 
Bismarck. Hence; this influence was a contributing factor 
in Thiers' downfall. (21) 
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(20) Bismarck, Ope cit., II, pp.182-3. A letter from von Bttlo 
quotes ltothomb ( the Bel~ian ambassador to Berlin .... usually ell 
inf ormed and verY keen) as quoting Thiers: "That man {i.e.Arn1m} 
has done'm~ evil; Ymuoh more, even, t han Bismarck knows or thinks." 
(21) For purposes of oonvenience is here appended a table of 
French administrative changes, fram 1871-81. 
Bismarck 
and 
the 
MacMahon 
Gov 't. 
• 
This brings us to the time when the adjustment to 
the new face of Europe is well on its way; when the ex-
traordinary nature of the relations between Fxance and 
Germany haa somewhat abated, and the normal balance is 
at least to be hoped for the future. Immediately after 
(21,- Continued:) 
President. 
Thiers. Feb.8,'?1 
Jules Gr~vy.Feb.3,18?9. 
Premier. 
de Broglie 
Cissey.May 22 
18?4 
Gavard (acting) 
Buffet. Feb.'?5 
Dufaure. " '?6 
Jules Simon 
Dec.13, 
l8?6. 
de Broglie. 
May 18, 
l8?? 
Rochebouet. 
Nov.24 
l8?? 
Dufaure. Dec. '?? 
Waddingt on . 
Freycinet. Jan. 
1880. 
Jules Ferry. ' 
Foreign Minister. 
JUles Favre 
d~ Rem\4sat..Ju1y 22 
Decazes 
" 
" 
Nov. 25 
" 
de Banneville. 
Waddington. 
" 
" 
Saint -H ilaire. 
Sept. '80 
Gambetta.Nov. '81. Gambetta. 
?? 
the French governmental revolution of May 24, 1873, 
Bismarck gave the most convincing of proofs that the 
Thiers government had been satisfactory to Ge~any, in 
spite of the Bonapartists and the Radicals! He refused 
to recognize the ambassador as the representative of the 
goven;ment headed by Marshal. MacMahon, wi thout new cre-
dentials. a'ontaut wro te: "Bismarck speaks flattering 
words about MacMahon, . without giving me any indication 
by which to judge whether or not he is disturbed by the 
changes in our government; for that he is much too olever~' 
(22) Austria, Russia, end Italy---a significant grouping-
followed Germany's lead, while England and Turkey, on the 
oontrary, demanded no new credentials. Bismarck empha-
sized his point by giving Arnim leave of absence, and 
saying that he saw no reasonable cause for the ambassa-
dor delaying in Paris, since he had no new credentials 
to hand in. The argument of the Chancellor, with his 
beautiful apparent candor, wa s to the effect that the 
Assembly was the real ruler, and that he had no author-
ization to accept changes of this nature. This, of 
(22) The ent ire subject is covered in Gontaut's memoirs, 
Part II, Chapters X, XI. The quotation is from page 300. 
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oou~ se, is pure sophistr,y, but it served its purpose. It 
taught the new government the lesson whioh the old had 
learned with pain and struggle of months; the lesson of 
German domination. Bismarok was taking the first oppor-
tuni ty, the ver,y earliest and henoe most effeotive of 
oooasions, to demonstrate to the Monarchists that they 
need not think to free themselves from the obsession 
which had ruled their predecessors. De Broglie's pro-
tests,suave as Thiers himself could have uttered them, 
met not the slightest response. The new minister of 
Foreign Affairs (23) might well have been oonvinoed 
then and there of t he futility of any attempt to make 
France independent of this alar.ming external influence. 
He yielded his point, as he must; the oredentials were 
despatched; the incident closed. Germany, of course, 
oommunicated the decision to Russia. De Broglie, brood-
ing over his lesson, wrote Gontaut that he fanoied a 
certain "Maochiavellian" (24) element in the favour 
which Bismarck had shown the preceding government, think-
ing it would keep prance in peaoe long enough for the 
T23) See tab'le, page 77. (24) De Broglie to Gontaut, May 27,1873. Gontaut, op.cit.,p. 
315-6. 
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p~ent of the debt, and would then leave her exposed 
to "new blows of fate" which Bismarck could turn to ac-
count for his own ends. As a matter of fact, though 
France was left stronger economically, and apparently 
on the real road to recover,y in this respect, she was 
certainly in no less turbulent a condi tion of party 
poli tic s at the end of the Thi ers regime than at the 
beginning---at the time of the Bordeaux compact. 
Aside from official action:, public opinion in 
Ger.many was pretty much divided. There was at the same 
time a natural feeling of satisfaction with the conser-
vative tone of the new administration, and a distrust 
of French rehabilitation, as threatening to Germany. 
The Emperor personally, so far as we may judge from 
his bearing toward the ambassador, was pleased with 
MaCMahon as the leader; but his Majesty's influence 
was narrow. There was some comment on the fact that a 
Marshal who had fought against Germany in active ser-
Vice, should now be at the helm. The most dyed-in-the-
wool of monarchists, therefore, reali2Sd the necessity 
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of pursuing the pOlicy of Thiers in foreign affairs. and 
adopting a wise reserve. in speech and action. This in-
tention was made clear to Germany directly, through the 
diplomatic despatches sent out by the new foreign minis-
ter. "The MacMahon government will not repudiate the pol-
icy, nor, more definitely, the debts of the Thiers gov-
ernment," was the burthen of these communioations. 
In the summer of 1873 the pilgrimage of the Ultra-
montanes attraoted the attention of the European press. 
In the sensitive frame of mind to whioh Germany was re-
duoed by her inoipient war with a portion of the Catholio 
Church, these demonstrations were natural ly looked upon 
with aversion. It was unfortunate for Franoe that her 
oitizens ----oitizens of a country where freedom of 
speech and action far exceeded that of any other European 
oountry---- should have been moved by this partioular 
emotional impulse. at t~is partioular time. and in suoh 
vast numbers. There oame into existence in Germany, not 
only in pppular but in offioial oircles, a growing feel-
ing that the new government stood for olerioalism, if not 
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Salzburg 
Negotia_ 
tions. 
as yet openly, at least negatively. The Emperor remarked 
philosophically, and pointedly, that politics is easily 
taken in tow by religion. (25) 
It was not calculated to appease this distrust that 
during these sarne months the "Salzburg negotiations" 
with the Duc de Chambord were gOing on. The visit of 
the Count of Paris to "H~nri V""at Frohsdorf, on August 
, 
fifth, which made apparent a complete reoonciliation be-
tween Legitimists and Orleanists, meant to Germany the 
imminent probability of an avowedly clericalist control 
of France. The aid of the Church would be an essential 
factor in the success of Monarchioal ideas and plans. 
The months of August and September, 1873, during which 
conferences of many sorts were undertaken and carried 
out by the Right, tc further its ends, were months of 
some embarrassment, nevertheless, for that body. The 
passivity of the Duc de Chambord,and his failure to come 
forth with any definite statement of his position, and 
the conflicting reports brought by his visitors, though 
in the main encouraging, hindered the taking of those de-
125) Report of Gontaut of a conversation with the Emperor: 
op.cit., II, p.322,ff. 
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cisive steps for which the party were so eager. These 
same circumstances, giving rise to a prevailing feeling 
of uncer$ainty, injured the French nation as a whole, in 
Germany. The conflict between traditional sympathy with 
monarchist ideas, and the desire for maintenance of a 
Republic as of more advantage to Germany,was lost in 
the predominance of the latter feeling, when fear of 
Clericalism was thrown into the scale. The irritation 
of Germany, which did not fail to become ~~ifest to 
France, complicated the situation of her internal af-
fairs the more. The fear, on her side, that Germany 
was planning for war in 1874, began " to creep in, and 
to find utterance in private letters and conversations, 
and even, vaguely, in official despatches. Orloff, 
that amiable go-between, suggested the possibility as 
not quite out of range. 
De Broglie, the r efore, continued to urge the futil-
ity of Gerr~ fear of French clericalism, and declared 
more explicitly than ever, while the monarchist scheme 
progressed, that any government must of necessity accept 
Thiers pacific policy. So long as negotiations with a 
claimant to the French throne continued, however, such 
assurances were of little avail in quieting Germany 
anxiety. At this exact point, stands out the important 
proof that France has entered on the new period of her 
relations wi th Germany~ IZar, just as soon as evacuation 
was complete, de Broglie wrote to his ambassador as fol-
lows: "You have means enough to convince those who will al-
low t hemselves to be convinced. And with the rest, do not 
concern yourself too much--------Sho':: neither too much ex-
citement nor too much anxiety. The main thing is, that 
the country is free; our debt is paid; we are no more de-
pendent on a smile or a frown. I knew perfectly well how 
very precarious this ~ ndependence is, on account of our 
empty arsenals, and our exposed borders, and upon what a 
weak foundation it stands; bu t in any case, they will have 
to seek new excuses to begin a strife with us. There is 
too much interest in monarchy in Euro~e to make it expe-
dient fer Bi smarck to fall upon us. We have, if not might, 
at least right." (27) 
- (27) Gontaut, Ope cit., II, p.340. 
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Here, then, was a mutual fear; Germany's fear of 
clericalism, in connection with a monarchist restoration 
in France; French fear .of hostili t ies from Germany on 
this account. Both were apparently deprived of justifi-
cation by the manifest of the Duc de CHambord, October 
twenty-seventh, 1873. This manifesto, (28) the death-
blow to the aspirations of the Right, was a blessing,so 
far as relations with Germany were concerned. The voting 
of the seven year term for the presidency, November, 1873, 
which defini tely counteracted that "provisional character" 
of the French government of which Germany had complained, 
was another step in advance fer ~rance. Germany greeted 
the act as a guaranty for French prosperity, and of the 
main tenance of her "good understanding" with "other 
states". (29) At the beginning of 1874, then, the future 
looked more hopeful for France than a t any t ime since the 
Peace of Frankfort, so far as outward indications go. 
But the habit of mind which had been acquired by the 
MacMahon government, the dread of a German outbreak of 
hostility; and the conviction in Germany that a recovering 
28 The Duc de C ambord wholly refused to be "king of the 
revolution" or to surrender any of the ancient traditions 
of his house" in particular, t he flag, symboliC of reaction. 
(29) Staatsa;chiv, 28, #5405. A quotation frim von Enlow. 
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France meant danger, whether from clericalism or mere 
lust for revenge, was not shaken off. Germany from this 
time on was warier, France not ·quite so humble, but the 
mutual distrust grew and grew. Aimim, on leaving his 
office, wrote to the Emperor, analyzing the entire sit-
uation as he saw it; and later events have borne out his 
prophecy--if not completely, at least in substance. "Just 
as soon," he wrote, "as the probable results of war become 
less ce~ainly destructive for France---one can reckon on 
the very unreckonableness of the French nature." 
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Chapter Three. 
The Return to Normal. 1873-5. 
After the period of inequality immediately succeed-
ing the war, the return to normal meant a readjustment to 
something like an even balance between France and Germany. 
This could not be accomplished in one year, or two:France 
was too thoroughly crushed for that; and even when the 
material reasons for her subjection to the will of Ger-
many had disappeared, the very force of administrative 
tradition made self-assertion difficult. It has been 
pOinted out that there were three factors giving France 
the opportunity to recuperate:her own remarkable economic 
elasticity; Bismarck's preoccupation with the Kulturkampfj 
and the force of European opinion. The prevailing con-
viction, also, has been st~ted, that so soon as France 
recovered, war must break out. Though she had not yet 
abandoned her apologetic tone, entirely, France in late 
1873 and 1874 was recovering. Bismarck, in the meanWhile, 
had not in the least modified his attitude; nor abated 
his arrogance one whit. Through these two years it 
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grows increasingly plain, therefore, that a crisis was 
a pproaching. It 1s the purpose of the present chapter 
to show in what -incidents the sense of French recovery 
began to filter into Franco-German consciousness; and 
how the crisis drew near. 
In late l8?3 and l8?4 the diplomatic calm was ru~­
fled somewhat unnecessarily by R _ Reries of despatches 
from Arnim, (1) in regard to the diplomatic relations of 
France with the Middle States. Rumours had traversed 
Paris of the intention of France to modify. her relations 
with these states, by raising her representat ives to 
ambassadorial rank. Arnim. hearing these rumours, ad-
dressed petulant complaints to BiEfmarck. It 'lfaS not 
so much fear of the ill-effect on the prestige o f the 
:Empire, which di sturb ed him, as dread of th e personal 
inconveniences which the Imperial amb assa.dor would suf-
fer from the presence of other German ambassadors in 
Paris. For this he was duly rebuked, in the inimitable 
stinging manner of his chief; but he had succeeded in 
stirring up Bismarck's irritation, never far below the 
(1) Staatsarchiv,28,#539?,5398,5403,540? Arnim's report of 
Dec. 18, 18?3jJan.12,18?4jDismarck'a replies of Dec. 23,Jan.2l. 
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surface. Bismarck was annoyed with the French Foreign 
Office. and with his ambassador himself; he wrote that 
the French government perfectly well knew the German 
position. Any enlargement of the scope of diplomatic 
activities of the lesser German states would be consid-
ered a breach of the spirit of the peace, which must be 
based upon French recognition of the new status of German 
Empire. Bismarck doubtless saw in this multiplied German 
representation,. a possibility of opposition to the Imper-
~ 
ial policy, although at the time when the exchange of 
opinion between him and Arnim took place, the diplo~tic 
representatives of the lesser courts had merely formal 
functions, and had given no cause for alarm. It was in-
evitably a part of his policy that the conduct of For-
eign Affairs should be concentrated in the Imperial For~ 
eign Office. Th~o di8cussion with Arnim might have re-
sulted in a note to the French government, had not 
Bismarck's annoyance with the ambassador been SUfficient 
to make him distrustful of any report from that source. 
The futility of Arnim's alarm is ob~1oust when we con-
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sider the conscientiousness with which the question had 
already been settled, and the precedent for French dip-
lomatic aotion established, before Th1ers went out of 
power. The game was most certainly, from the French 
pOint of view, not worth the candle. 
It was just before the fall of Thiers, as we have 
seen, that a feeling of dissatisfaction with Arnim arose, 
. 
and in this same year Gontaut was sounded more than once 
on the French impression of Arnim's trustworthiness. In 
April, for example, Bleichr~der, a German banker in inti-
mate relat ions with the Chancellor, spoke to Gontaut about 
the probable successor to the post, in case Arnim should 
be removed. He asked confidentially whether it were true 
that Thiers had expressed a wish for the diplomat's re-
moval, and Gontaut replied characteristically, that he 
had not heard a syllable of it. He had at that time. of 
course, no instructions, but later, on his return from ~; 
vacation in Paris. he "did not concealfrom Bismarck" in 
a con~idential conversation, that Arnimts bearing was 
rather cool and unfriendly. This was of course after 
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the negotiations of Maroh. l8?3. and Arnim was feeling 
himself deoidedly under a oloud. in the eyes both of 
the French and the German world. The first of the next 
year he was reoalled. In December, l8?4, he was brought 
to trial in Germany for abstraction of documents belong-
ing to the Foreign Offioe, and intent to use them improp. 
erly. The features of the trial, and the points of his 
defense, do not ooncern our subject in themselves. (2) 
the point at whioh the trial touohed French and German 
relations, was in the publioation of the documents during 
the proceeding s. These were despatches of Arnim and 
Bismarck. and others of the Foreign Offioe, showing the 
outlines of the German policy toward France. We have 
quoted suffiCiently, on various topics, to illustrate 
the oharaoter of these intimate oommunioations, and the 
(2) The documents used in the trial m~ be olassified roughly 
as follows: Topic I.Arnim and ThiersjStaatsarchiv,Bd.28,#5380, 
5385,5392. Topio II,Germany and the French parties,#5385,5,6. 
8.5401.4. TopiC III,Russia and FrariC~;#538l.IV:ltaly,and the 
Papal 8ee:#5384,5405,8. See note, page 141. V:The press:#5382, 
5390. ~:Anti-German feeling in Franoe;#538? 8,5393.4.6,9,5400. 
VII: French finances:#5389. VIII:Evacuation:~5395. IX:The mid-
dle states; #5397,8,5403.? X:The pastoral letters,#540l,2. 
For additional documents, see Schulthess, Ope cit. l5,pp.253,4, 
6. For correspondence with German officials about his sins of 
omission and commission, Anhang etc. ,#51-64. His Withdrawal, 
ibig.#2l,22,23,24,20. The Antwort contains Arnim's letter of 
the Emperor,April ?,18?3,analyz1ng the course of the negotia-
tions of the month before. Bismarck's own view of the trial and 
of Arn1m's guilt, op.cit. II,Chapter XXVI,p.I?? ff. The problem 
as to the extent of Arnim's guilt.as to his motives in delaying 
the negotiations if he was guilty,and Bismarck's motives if he 
Was not guilty. are all to be solved. The justice of Arnim's 
defense is quite apparently flimsy, but should be definitely 
disproved. 
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lines of conduct and of bearing which were pointed out 
therein. The ~rench were quite convinced that the pub-
lication of these despatches was the sole raison d'etre 
of the trial; as a less al to France. (3) Even a German 
official wrote after an interview with Bismarck that the 
latter would be pleased if the documents could be pub-
lished without injury to the Emperor. (4) Doubtless 
Bismarck was glad of the opportunity to administer to 
France one of hi. periodic warnings. but it cannot with 
fairness be claimed that this was his only reason for 
the action against th e ambassador. Personal rancour per-
haps entered in to scme extent ,and still more. the neces-
sity of preserving diplomatic discipline, which would be 
shaken to its very foundations by such conduct from min-
isters as Arnim's had been. The French feeling that the 
trial and publication of the documents displayed Bis-
marck's policy toward the vanquished a~ brutally and undu-
ly severe was balanced by the German conviction that 
Arnim's line of action. shadowed so .frequently in these 
notes, would have lost to Germany the benefits of her 
(~) See Deca~es remark, auoted Hanotaux,op,cit,III,p.l03. 
(4) Hohenlohe,op,oit.II,p.136. 
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victory t and effec:ted in France a highly desirable state 
of affairs. The French felt that Bismarck's support of 
the Republic was displayed as wholly actuated by self-
interest; the wish to keep France divided. But on the 
other hand, complain of Bismarck as they might t and at-
tribute to him brutality and tyranny, they could not 
help recognizing the magnitude of their own fault in 
allowing the anti-German feeling in Paris to swell so 
h:i€h as Arnim had reported it again and again; endanger-
ing the peace of Europe with pett y annoyanoes. The trial 
naturally produced a reaction in favour of the Chancellor 
among his own people, making the dominance of any possi-
ble feeling of pity for ~rance, or wish for a French and 
German rapprochement still more an impossibility. The 
Due Decazes attempted to turn to account the evidences 
of what he considered Bismarck's unjustifiably rigorous 
policy, in bringing about a European sympathy for France, 
and this may account for the. indubitable gradual spread 
of a feeling that France,though the aggressor in 1870, 
had received more in the way of retribution than her 
sins deserved. 
In January, 1874, onCa Arnim's withdrawal was cer-
tain, Bismarck had an interview with Gontaut-Biron (5) 
in regard to Arnim's successor. One point in the conver-
. 
sation is worth noting:on Manteuffel's being suggested 
for the post, Gontaut replied that France was completely 
satisfied with his conduct of affairs during the period 
of occupation. but that his military title was egainst 
him. This is an implicit acknowledgement by Gontaut of 
that militarist spirit in France which he was usually 
at such pains explicitly to deny. 
The choice at length fell upon Prince Hohenlohe, who 
succeeded Arntm in the spring of 1874. (6) Before he took 
OVer the office he had several very frank talks with the 
Cfiancellor, in which the attitude of a German ambassador 
to France was prescribed for him. (7) Bismarck took occa-
sion to impress upon him the importance of t he post .• and 
the difficult ies which he had had in find1~ a suitable 
ambassador, in view of (A) his conviction that a non-
Prussian would fill the position most satisfactorily 1n 
(5) Gontaut, o~cit. p.S81 ff. (App.) (6) Chlodwig. ~rst von.Hohenlohe. Brother to the Cardinal. 
His later career as minister to PariS, and successor to 
Manteu~fe1 in Alsaoe, and at length as Chancellor, 1894-1901, 
is well known. 
(7) Hohenlohe. op.c1t. II,pp.106-12l. 
the eyes of the French, and (B) the necessity that the 
representative of the German Empire be a German of true 
imperial feeling. Before tie appointment was actually made, 
Bismarck had begun to emphasize to Hohenlohe the familiar 
note:~Ve will keep the peace, but if Franoe begins to 
fortify and arm, so that they are ready in five years to 
strike loose, then we will begin the war in three years. W 
In the offioial interviews before Hohenlohe's departure, 
all the beliefs of Germany in regard to prance, which 
had been growing and clarifying during the Arntm period, 
were brought out into the light and given definite shape. 
(A) France must not win allies. (B) Hence, it is to the 
best interest of Gennany to keep her feeble, and for this 
the Republic is the most suit able government. Of the other 
possibilities, a monarchy on Orleanist lines would be 
dangerous to Germany because of its Clericalism; a mon-
archy along Legitimist lines will never be effected; and 
the Bonapart1st possibility is next to the Republic de-
sirable fran the German point of view, because of the 
inner difficulties which would oonfront such a government. 
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(0 ) French colonial act1v1t1es---1n Tunis, particularly--
should be encouraged, as distracting to the French atten-
tion. (D) As to the preparation for hostilities, keep the 
pacific side foremost, but bear in mind that if France 
prepares to strike, Germany may strike first; !h!! is 
the counsel to a new ambassador. There is nothing novel 
here; we have seen the working out of just such ideas 
during the period of occupation. But Germany's interest 
is now more insistently expressed by Bismarck than ever, 
exactly because prance is beginning once more to assume 
the aspect of a foeman worthy of the German steel. Arnim, 
it will be remembered, was told not to mak~ advances; to 
allow things to take their own course, which, so long as 
it remained an unhappy course for France, was not trouble-
some to Germany. Hohenlohe'9 instructions are more spe-
cific; no longer, a course of watchful waiting, but the 
act ive insistence upon German princ iples, in every event ,. 
It was little wonder that the Duc Decazes, When the 
new ambassador arrived, thought that the reason for 
Bismarck's withdrawal of Arnim was the latter's too 
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pacific tendency. "Now all this is to be changed," said 
the Duke. Hohenlohe's attitude was unbending. In the 
light of our fuller knowledge Decazes first hypothesis 
is absurd; Arnimts friendship for the French being far 
less sincere than Hohenlohets; but the temperamental 
reserve of the Prince was calculated to impress France 
with a new conviction of the futility o~ the Peace of 
Frankfort. 
The explanation, then, for the events of l8?3-5, 
is no longer in the arrogance of Germany, and the fears 
of France, but in a mutual distrust, tinged with fear 
on both sides. The first incident of a really alarming 
character, after the formation of the MacMahon govern-
ment. was the protest of Germany in December, l8?3, to 
the pastoral letters of the French bishops of some of 
the departments. The intimate relations of the KulturkamIf · 
to the foreign policy of Germany, and the impossibility of 
isolating a single series of events, is perfectly illus-
trated in this affair. Decazes, indeed, believed that 
one motive force in Bismarck's struggle against the Cath-
9? 
olicism of the new papal deorees was the desire to win 
a favourable position against Fran~ by assuring the 
oooperation of Italy. (8) The unquestionably sincere and 
extremely impolitic French bishops were actuated by as 
mixed motiVes, on their part. They doubtless felt that 
in their invectives against the ferocity of the German 
government toward their brother Catholics, in their ref-
erence to the "Pope of Berlin", and their prayers for the 
restoration of the lost provinces, (9) they were express-
ing their love for their Church, and inCidentally for 
their country. But we cannot question that these excel-
lent gentl~en were urged on to such utterances, also, by 
mere unclerical hatred of Germany and of her Chancellor, 
such as any layman might have felt. Germany can hardly 
be blamed for her resentment of such exhortations. 
This was the occasion of the protest, and the course 
of the incident was as follows. On December twentieth,the 
German government protested to the French government 
against any such partisan use of ecclesiastical influ-
ence. A few days later, the French Kinister of Ecclesias-
(8) Decazes to Gontaut, Gontaut, op.cit.II,p.392. See the 
remark of Dreux(see APp.A,Bibliography)1£!g.p.364;wThe lively 
uneasiness which his own inner policy caused Prince Bismarck 
at this time. reacted upon the relations between France and 
Germany. This uneasiness had two causes:the struggle again t 
the Catholic clergy.whose opposition was growing strongerjand 
the deliberation over an imperial military bill." 
(9) The Bishops of Anger, Nimes, and Nancy are here quoted. 
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tical Affairs addressed to the Bishops. in response to 
this protest, a letter urging thgm to abstain from utter-
ances on political affairs. The German government took 
no further official action for the present, but Decazes 
felt th I¢ he did not dare to oonsider the incident con-
cluded. And meanwhile Gontaut was active, in an attempt 
to conVince Bismarck and his subordinates of the entire 
absence of ill-intent on the part of France. and of her 
irresponsibility for the expressions of opinion of these 
members of the clergy;of her disapproval, indeed, of any 
such manifestations. Public opinion in Germany, however. 
was aroused, and was not allowed so easily to subside. 
On January fifth. von B~low inquired of Gontaut whether 
the French government -was not prepared to take some def-
inite action to prevent the seditious utterances of tne 
clergy. The French ambassador replied that he considered 
the letter of the minister (above referred to) as a suf-
fioient guaranty. On this point the German government 
could not agree with him, and from a despatch from Arnim 
it appears that Bismarck even went so far as to busy 
himself with the provisions of the French laws in regard 
to the proteotion of foreign monarchs from slander. In 
a further interview of the thirt eenth of January ,Bismarck 
made still more emphatic demands for a decree of the 
French government of more weighty import than the minis-
terial letter. The French government still delayed,{lO) 
and Bismarck on the fifteenth, as the Norddeutsche Allge-
meine Zeitung testified, sent to the representatives of 
Germany at foreign capitols a circular letter to the ef-
fect that Germany could not guarantee to wait for a dec-
laration of war fran France, if France persist eel in un-
friendly demonstrations. It was decidedly time for the 
French government to do something to avert a calamity, 
On the nineteenth of January. ov er a month after the 
first disturbance created by the clerical indiscretions, 
the French government ordered the suppression of the 
"Univers," an obnoxious oxgan which had published and 
made muoh of the pastoral letters. On the twentieth, 
in answer to an interpellation on the subjeot of French 
relation to Italy and the Papal See, Decazes, after a 
(10) The remark of Bismarck to Gontaut, that this affair 
dragged on because of Arnim's delays, was interpreted by 
Gontaut as of friendly import; but when the above is known--
i.e., that Arnim was instructed to acquaint himself with the 
legal regulations, with a view to formal aotion on the part 
of the Frenoh government, Bismarok's statement takes on a 
sinister signif icancs. 
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deolaration of the paoific policy of France in this par-
ticular. made the following statement: "-----our general 
policy in the whole world is directed by the same consid-
erations, and haa the same foundations. We wish peace; 
we wish peace, because we consider it necessary for the 
greatness and the flowering of our countr.y; because we 
believe it is eagerly desired by all, eagerly furthered. 
In order to assure it we will labor without ceasing, to 
disperse all misunderstanding. and avoid all conflicts; 
and we will uphold it against idle rumours, against dis-
trustful irritation, may they come from where they will. " 
He concluded with the point that France, which was so 
weak in the eyes of Europe, was not lacking in moral 
strength, and had the courage to be prudent. The speech 
was not intended for the ears of his own countrymen alone, 
but as a capitulation, in some sort, and in some sort a 
defiance to Bismarck. Its author sent it to the German 
capitol at once. (11) 
The end was not yet. Again von B~low said to Oontaut~ 
"This does not sufflce,"---although the Chancellor and the 
(ll)Decazes to Gontaut, Jan.18: Put off sub Ission to th 
last minute; bu t we cannot let it come to an op n or 
e are not r eady for ar. Gontaut, OPt cltA , p.385-? 
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Emperor himself were rejoioed at these measures and in-
dioations! Arn1m. on his return fram Berlin, early in 
February, brought extensive proposals for legal measures 
of the sort suggested by the Chanoellor and von B~low. 
But on the objeotion of the Frenoh minister, this was 
dropped, and by the middle of the month, Gontaut oould 
report that all was quiet, and the matter apparently 
olosed. What was the explanation for this sudden ohange 
of front? One m~ be, that the German govBrnments had 
seoured from Franoe a demonstration of humility, and 
knew that the matter oould not be pushed to the point of 
a declaration, without European disapproval, and probably 
intervention. The French minister heard from London that 
Lord GranVille was muoh disturbed, but "will not or oan 
not" speak a weighty word in Berlin. (12) Decazes was 
oonvinoed that the oourts of Germany's colleagues in the 
"Three Emperors' Alliance", in spite of that bond, felt 
"that human arrogance oannot overstep oertain bounds,and 
may not set itself outside oertain oonsiderations, with-
out danger to society." (13) In St. Petersburg. indeed, 
(12) Gontaut, OPt oit. ,II, p.390 e 
(13) Ibid,390. 
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( 
Lef16 received specific assurances of a comforting na-
ture. (14) The Czar himself declared that he considered 
the whole affair a stratagem of Bismarck's, to divert 
attention from hi9 inner difficulties; it was no threat 
of war, in reality, said the Czar. The Russian Chancel-
lor went a step farther, telling the French ambassador 
in confidence that Ru~~a had not always been in sym-
pathy with Germany, of late, and that this difference 
was especially in regard to the Kulturkampf. The gen-
eral feeling seemed to prevail throughout Europe. that 
Bismarck was anxious to involve other nations in this 
quarrel; Andrassy and Lord Odo Russell, as well as Gort-
chakoff, expressed themselves on this point. (15) The 
Times~ with an air of impartiality, published an edito-
rial to the effect that Ger.many considered the agitation 
of the Ultramontanes against her had Paris for a centre; 
that France, to secure a stable and lasting peace, must 
repUdiate an~ policy of submission to the Ultramontanes, 
and had done wisely in recognizing the justice of German 
complaint3 and taking the measures of repression. (16) 
(14) Ibid., 398-9. (15) Austrian Chancellor and the English ambassador in Berli~. 
(16) Friday, ~an.23,18?4. 
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That there was truth in this interpretation, and that 
Bismarck was actually showing France that her position 
In the Kulturkampf was of importance to him, was testi-
fied by the Chan cellor himself in that early convetl"sation 
with Gontaut, (Jan.13) before the French suppression of 
the Univers, or Decazes speech. At that time Bismarck 
had pointed out that he had undertaken war with the 
Church unto the end t and that it was his duty to find 
out who were, and who might become, the allies of his 
opponent s. (l?) 
A second explanation for the cessation of all agita-
tion early in February, was offered by Gontaut and the 
Duo Decazes, with some conviction, to one another. This 
was, that Bismarck had employed the popular feeling, the 
official protest, and the measures of the French govern-
ment, as a campaign asset in the January elections to the 
Reichstag, to strengthen public teeling in favour of his 
poliCies. The election hewing resulted in the numerical 
increase both of National Liberals. and of Ultramontanes, 
to the cost of the intermediate parties. and with a 
(1'7) Yet that France, in this connection,was more the object ot 
German watchfulness than any other possible opponent, was evi-
denced by von B~low's answer to the following perfectly logical 
objection. made by Gontaut:that Archbishop Manning (Eng.) ex-
pressed similar sentiments to those of the French bishops, and 
the German government took no such steps. "The English," von B~low replied, "are not, like you, our neighboris, andf what P~S8-
es there arouses less feeling here than any act on 0 yours. 
Gontaut, op,oit.p,3'75, Unfortunate for France! 
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Liberal majority, Bismarck could afford to let the mat-
ter drop. 
At all events, a lesson had been brought home to 
both countries:to France, that Bismarck as he openly 
stated, in oase of any serious aggression would not 
wait for a French declaration of war; to Germany: that 
she had European opinion to consider. even though France 
was yet without those allies which Bismarok dreaded of 
all things. Further.more. that olose oonneotion in the 
German mind of any French hostility, with the Kultur-
kampf, was brought to light. 
The speech from the throne at the opening of the 
Reiohstag. read by Bismarok for the Emperor, contained 
a passage in regard t~ the foreign relations of Germany 
whioh orystallized the result and signifioanoe of the 
whole inoident. The speeoh oonoluded: ~Our foreign re-
lations justify the oonviotion that all alien governments. 
like our own, are decided and exercised to secure to the 
world the benefits of peaoe, and to al.low themselves to 
make no miatakes-----through party differenoes. to destrqy 
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thi s. The repeated meet ings of mighty, peace-loving 
monarchs. standing in olose personal bonds one with an-
other, and the happy relations of Germany to that people 
friendly to her through al.1Jt~Btorioal ~x:aMt~.Q.ll, gives 
His MaJ esty the limperor complete and firm trust in the 
continuanoe of peace. " .. (18) And on his side, Decazes felt 
that he might justly take courage, though "far from hav-
ing won the game yet, either in Vienna or St,fg.!,.ersburg," 
Nevertheless, fran the indioations which he had received 
during this distressing month, he hoped for a change in 
favour of France, in European opinion, brought about by 
the reasonableness of Frenoh ~olicy, and the rigour of 
Bismarck's. (19) 
The tensity between the two oountries after this 
incident began to make each the more suspicious of the 
other, even in matters which in their origin had no di-
rect bearing on Franoo-German relations. Such an inCi-
dent, which grew to somewhat threatening proportions, 
arose out of the revolutionary struggles in Spain. (20) 
Early in July, 1874, a G.rman war correspondent, one 
(18) Staatsarch1v, 27,#5335. (19) See the--ietter of Dec~es to Gontaut, March 10,1874. 
(Gontaut, OPt oit., II, pp.418-9,note.)When the strain was 
removed, Deoazes poured out his soul to his confidant, ith 
that eloquence and abandonment to self-pity which a Frenoh 
orator knows how to employ. He cited Bismarck's brusque lan-
guage in describing the Frenohottbarbers, tailors, barbarians," 
as quoted by a Hungarian ~ourna1i9t . (Afterwards denied b 
~ official German press.) He oited the rapre sentation o. 
Bismarck at the time of the murder ot a Oerman teamster by 
certajn French citizens whereas at the same time Frussian 
soldiera were doing dam~e wholesale. unreproved.(?) He cited 
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Von Sohmidt, was murdered by the Carl1sts of Estrella. 
Bismarok was perhaps not unwilling to seize upon this 
perfectly justifiable pretext, to illustrate his posi-
t i on . He adopted two di at inct lines of action: represen-
tations to the French government that their patrolling 
of t heir Spanish border was proving inefficient, and 
that the penetration of arms and supplies of all kinds 
t o the Carlists in this manner would be considered a 
h ost i l e s ign from France, if not checked; and second: 
r epresentations to all the governments of Europe as to 
the feasibility of recognizing the government of Marshal 
Serrano , in order to give sanction to the efforts of 
t he cha r act er istic ref erence of iamarck from the floor of 
th~ Reich s t ag , to t he pr obable difficul~ies in Alsace-
Lo~raine , had the situation been reversed. These, in the 
eyes of t he Duke, were insults and only illustrations of 
the brut ality of Bismarck's policy , Orloff,who as a rule, 
had much b etter have kept silence, asserted that Bismarck 
boasted of his one and only instruction to his ministers to 
foreign courts: "Oppose the French minister;" that is all ye 
know on earth, and all ye need to know! It was a moral war 
which the Chancellor was carrying on against his neighbor ing 
c ountry (so Decazes) and the Duke, in an outburst of irony, 
sugg ested: "Prince Bismarck was of the opinion that my exist-
ence was too peaceful, and my patience not yet sufficiently 
t ested. " 
lO? 
This is all very pitiful,and calculated to rouse cur sym-
pathy for the minister of a government which had inherited all 
the distrust earned by its tmperial predecessor,but it should 
not be forgotten that it was actually to thg interests ~Fran~, 
until those allies which she hoped for coUl be se~tnre~~u r e -
r~sent Germany as utterly unreasonable and quite inhuman~o 
Decazes was wise enQugh to know that one CaD hardly COnylnce 
others of what one does not onesselr heartllyoelleve. GOnVlc-
tion, like a number of other desirable qualities, begins at 
home;and it extends as far as the diplomatiC representatives 
in foreign countries, in usefulness. 
(20) In this struggle the Carliets, (adherents of Don Carlos) 
earned German hatred by their Ultramontane character. 
that government against the Carlists. To baok up his 
first aotion, ~ismarok ordered German gunboats down the 
ooast of Spain ', as a warning to Franoe t and to the Carl-
ists, while Hohen1ohe explained to Deoazes---quite su-
perf1uous1y!--~-the dip1omatio significanoe of this move. 
(21) Deoazes was again plunged into a fever of anxiety, 
which was not heightened by the reoeption of a note from 
the Spanish general. Serrano, in the haUghtiest terms, 
demanding better regulation of this border traffic. The 
note in itself was not alarming, but Decazes understood 
that it neoessarily had German support, for without this 
a government on suoh unsteady feet as that of Serrano 
WOUld never have damed so address the French government. 
The French press united in the adoption of a conciliatory 
tone; Decazes assur~d Hohen1ohe that there should be no 
negleot on the part of the Frenoh offioials, and that 
the measures already taken would be still more thoroughly 
enforced. As to Bismarckts seoond action, Gontaut in 
August was oommissioned to oonfer with von B~lo about 
the matter of recognition~.As the Journal Des D~bats 
21 Uohen1ohe Opt c :it. II.p.l31. Note of July 28. It was 
doub tl ess true t that this passage of suppl! es OY3!' the border 
was tak1ng pLace; amd the general interpretation of this care-
lessness of the French officials was that it was calculated to 
appease th e French Legitimif;lts. 
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v ery justly remarked: ~t is our own after all but a 
de facto government?" (22) In August, then, the European 
countries, includin g France, and without Russia, (23) 
joined in recognizing the Serrano government,and no fur-
ther danger of war involving France and Germany was to be 
expected from tha~ quarter. (24 ) 
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(22 See the London Ttmefl of July 29 to Aug.I, for French and 
German press comments. The G ~rman attitude was expressed thus 
by a Berlin correspondent: "The truly Ultramontane hatred of Ger-
many displayed by the Carlist leaders,and the notorious conniv-
ance of the French authorities at their military operations,have 
produced a very strong impression in this country.----Don Carlos 
----might be tempted to become the future ally of France in a 
war of reprisals." 
(23) See Bismarok's explanation of Russia's refusal, an d of the 
advisability of general recognition,before the Re1chstag,(~. 
Red.VI,p.215.) The argument runs as follows: (a)Ho intervention 
in Spain intended. The murder of a German citizen.however,can-
not go unavenged. (b)Ths Spanish government not in a condition 
to be held responsible;best course, then, the strengthening of 
the government. (c)This aocomplished by the general European 
recognition. Russia excepted,beoause of her remoteness from 
Spain,and because Spanish disturbanoes do not touch her polit-
ically. The speech concludes with a reference to the attempt ed 
assassination of the Chancellor on July 14, and the declaration 
of the fanatic that he was in sympathy with the Centre party, 
and they with him.-----Was Russia's failure to accede to the 
German request for united European action in the recognjtion, 
an indication of the approach of Russian policy toward the sup-
port of France? In the light of those other indications of this 
year, discussed in Chapter I, it is perh~s not unwarrantable 
to assume that it was, in spttte of Bismarck's plausible ex-
planation. (24 ) One rather remarkable feature of this affair, as recorded by 
Hohenlohe is the relation of the Emperor to Bismarck's action. 
On the 30' of August the ambassador had an intervie ith thQ. 
Emperor himself) in hich tbe lat ter c~plainedL~peaking 0f~the Spanish situation. that he hardly knew \there Bi smIck wa~ t~ing 
him. "One must be conserva'tive---Bismarck see8 that hirnself---
but how is it possible after one has gone 80 far?" Then,on the 
fourth of Octooer Hohenlohe and Bism trck talked over tne same 
IDEJ,tter and Bismar&k gSYe his minister a somewhat surprisiqg hView 
or the'action taken by the German government. Accordlng to t is 
recital the Chancellor had empowered von B~low to souna the pow-
ers as ~o whether recognition were feasible. Instead of imit-
ing himself to these instructions von Bftlow laid before the 
Emperor a circular despatch oontalning a plan of recognition. 
On its second presentatiob, the Emperor approved it, and as 
Bismarck picturesquely put it, the recognition followed, "like 
plums falling from trees. " Hohenlohe ,Opt c:i·t. II ,p.l~5. 
Other 
Evidences. 
Other evidences of Germany's increasingly belliger-
ent attitude were her resentment of the condemnation of 
Marshal Bazaine. for example.(25) and the publication 
during his trial of certain information about the con-
duct of the war; (26) or, another example, her attitude 
in the International Conference on the Rights of War, in 
which she Claimed all rights for invaders; or. a still 
more striking instance, her frequent reomnstrances about 
the increased armaments of France. (2?) The feeling 
~~ainst Ultramontanism was mounting higher and higher; it 
was given impetus. too, by the attempt of one Kullman, on 
July fourteenth,18?4, at Kissingen, to assassinate Bis-
marck. (28) It was evidenced in the unnecessary severity 
of Bism arck' s representations to Belgium, practically 
aCCUsing her of general complicity in the fanatic avowals 
of Duchesne, a Belgian coppers~ith who proposed to kill 
the Chancellor. ThiS, as we have already demonstrated, 
reacted upon Franco-German relations, so that French 
Ultramontanism had coma to seem all of France, in the 
German opinion. and Ultramontanism itself, odious. These 
(25) The trial of the Marsh al..October 6-Decet;tber lO,l8'73,was 
for the capitulation of Uetz.and surrender of the "Army of the 
Rhine." (26)As.for example,that the German army in the battle of St. 
Privat exceeded the . .r'rench,and at that was nearly defea.ted! 
Gontaut,op,cit.II,p.3?? 
(27) See below,Chap.IV,note ? 
(28) See above, Chap. III, note 23. 
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petty complications---the Pastoral letters, the forcing 
of France to recognize the Serrano government, all of 
Germany' 8 little triumphs-----would be wearisome to fol-
low if it were not that they were all ripples on ~ sur-
f ac e of a deeper movement; a movement slow, constant, un-
c easing. The prevalent uneasiness found expression in 
Lor d John Russell's interpellation of May fourth, 1874, 
in the English Parliament, in regard to the peace of 
Europe. (29) The reply of Lord Derby, conservative as it 
was, and meant to reassure, still left the little flame of 
anxiety creeping and alive. Though distinguishing between 
immediate and future cause for apprehension, the Earl ad-
mitted that he could not deny the latter, and said; ~e 
know the feelings which they (the events of 1870) have 
left in the minds of two great populations, and which, 
as those populations are composed of human beings, it 
was impossible they should not have left." (30) 
To summarize. then the stat e 0 f at'f airs at the be-
ginn i ng of 1875; the two countries were nearer an equal 
footing t r an at the beginning of the previous year; yet 
~29) Hansard, Parlimn:enfaiY:,Pebate:s:. Vol.21.8,pp.l564-9. 
"Moved that an humble address be presented to Her MaJ esty 
for copies of any correspondence relating to the maint n&nc~ 
of the peace of Europe-----" 
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(30) Cf. the Times,May 6,1865. "The French people would have 
been a race of seraphs if they had boma with resignation the 
tremendous disaster of the war, or if they had accepted the 
conditions of peace with meek thankfulness." 
the danger of an outbreak of hOBtilities was far greater. 
The German press held up before the eyes of the German 
people without cessation the probability of a French 
declaration of war----war for revenge. The French gov-
ernment and population, on the other hand, placed the 
utmost threatening construction upon Bismarck's words 
to the effect that he would not wait for the French dec-
laration when he though it actually on the way. Both 
parties were playing for the benevolence, and if possibl~ 
the still sturdier support, of the other EUropean coun-
trias, and in particular. Russia. The Czar alone, of 
continental figures, was optimistic; his was an optimiam 
springing from his trust in his uncle. But the prevail-
jng opinion was that war---not must---but very probably 
might come; and tha~ peace was to be desired. Just how 
far that European opinion would take shape, and block 
the path of either country in advance on the enemy, was 
the problem which was decided in 18?5. 
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Chapt er Four. 
In the Balance. 1875. 
To write of the spring of 1875 in Paris and Berlin, 
one should be Psychologist, almost more than historian. 
The crisis of that time sprang not so much from any ser-
ies of events, as from a morbid state of mind. What 
this had come to be, and what elements entered into its 
development, We have attempted to shaw in previous chap· 
ters. The purpose of the chapter before us is to de-
scribe the manifestation which this state of mind as-
sumed, and to poir.t out hOW, with its expression, the 
shadow of fear was to a great extent dispelled, and 
France and Germany appeare~ to one another in their true 
lights. (1) 
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(l) To facilita.te the understanding of this complicated sit-
uation, a. calendar of events and diplomatic moves in the spring 
of 18'75 is here appended. 
March l3-------------Third reading of StUffs Law before 
French Asaembly. 
" 2l-------------French Assembly adjourns (to May 11) 
" 30---__________ Nationalzeitung declares French 
arrangement for fourth ~attal10n 
a preparation for war. 
April 2--------------Venice interview between Franois 
Joseph and Victor Emmanuel. 
" 5 ______________ K~lnische Ze1tung publishes list 
of grievances ogainst ·France. De-
clares union of Monarchiato and 
Republicans was effected for sole 
purpose of pushing through army law. 
" 7---------------Marshal MacMahon convinces Leflo 
in conversation at the Elys~e of 
danger from Germany. 
" 9---------------Post article: "War in Prospect?" 
" 10------ ________ ~ements of Norddeu1!che Zeitupg. 
Lef18 and Gortchakoff: "You al!tl'121 
yourself. " 
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It was the last week of February that Germany--or her 
Chancellor--gave a sign that could not fail to be under-
(l,cont. ) 
April l2------~---Disraeli,1n Commons, declares the 
Belgian incident closed. (See above, 
page 110. 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
May 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
If 
? 
l3----------Crown Prince reassures Sir Robert 
Morier. 
15----------The limperor William: flThey have tried 
to make us quarrel." 
Conversation of the Czar and Leflo: 
"It would beat her own risk." 
----------Gontaut-Biron and Radowitz. 
19----------Discussion of German and Belgian 
correspondence,in the English Par-
liament. 
2l----------The Czar gives audience to General 
von Werder. 
28-----~----Deoazes converses with Hohenlohe. 
29---------- " writes fully to Gontaut and 
Lef10. 
----------Baron Nothomb sees Marshal von Moltke. 
4----------Decazes sees Prince Hohenlohe for a 
second interview. 
Count SChouvaloff leaves St.Peteraburg. 
General Lefle telegraphs of audience 
with the Czar. 
Bismarck writes to »tlperor William 
that he cannot carry on duties muoh 
longer. 
5---------- Schouvaloff in Berlin. Conversation 
with Bismarck. 
6----------Schouvaloff and Bi~rck. 
General Lefle writes fully of the 
Czar's promises to secure peace. 
Times art icle. 
?----------Gontaut sees von B~low. 
8----------~eoazes writes to Gontaut that he 
fears agitation from Germany for dis-
armament. 
lO----------Gortchakoff in Russia. 
Lord Odo RUBsell sees Bismarck with 
offer of friendly intervention. 
Meeting between Czar and Kaiser. 
Norddeutsche Zeitung:Nothing ju tit'ies 
alarmist campaign. 
11------- -- Foreign Secretary of England declares he 
has received assurances from Berlin. 
Prohibi-
tion 
of 
Exporta-
tion 
of 
Cavalry 
Horses. 
stood. Information reached Bismarck's ears (2) that 
German horse-dealers had received orders to buy ten 
thousand cavalry horses for France. without limitation 
as to price. This was a manifestation of the activ-
ities of prance in army reorganization, but Bismarck 
took such action as ~o give it a speoial significanoe. 
He issued an order against the exportation of horses, 
reasoning that it was oe~ainly not to Germany's in-
terest to help France in suoh reorganization. "which is 
notoriously intended for us." (~) Gontaut himself was 
( 1 ;o'orit . ) 
May 
" 
14 -------~aintenant la paix est assur~e." 
24--------Disr~e1i acknowledges that Queen remon-
strated with Emperor William about 
Franoo-German relations. 
" 3l--------Lord Derby attributes sour~e of anxiety 
to "words uttered by exalted persons in 
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Germany. " 
8--------Yittnacht (Bavarian minister) to Bismarok 
ot' the need of reorganizat 10n of the 
dip lomatic committee of the Re1chstag. 
(2) Through the publication of the item by the ~~~~ 
Zeitung and other ~pers pupularly regarded as inspired,the 
story was disseminated. When Gontaut returned to Germany the 
middle of April, he denied entirely that the order proceeded 
from the war ministry, and at the same time the Franch govern-
ment published denials of rumours of similar orders sent to 
Bohemia and Switzerland. The question remains open. 
(3) Bismarck to Hohenlohe, Feb. 26, 18?5. Hohenlohe, Opt oit. 
II, pp.15l-2. 
I 
I 
Staffs 
Law. 
out of Berlin on a vacation at the time, but in his busi-
ness the acting charg~ d'affaires (4) telegraphed to De-
cazes (March 5) of this---qu1te characteristic!---
B1smarckian act. In Paris, naturally, it was received 
as a confirmation of the general suspicions; we have 
alre ady noted that Decazes not wholly disinterested ten-
dency was toward the alarmist's reading of all signs. 
(5) France wished more than ever to have in the eyes of 
the world of diplomacy an air of cons!stent prudence and 
reserve; her only fears being Bismarck's nerves, or some 
misstep of her own. However, in spite of this alarm, no 
further signs of hostility from Germany came to light 
for some time, as Gontaut recorded, (6) almost with a 
note of disapPointment. 
There is little doubt, however, that the spirit of 
unrest did much to hasten the passage of the Staffs Law 
(7) which was read for the third time on March thir-
teenth, and accepted by a remarkable combination of re-
publicans and monarchists. The amendment creating a 
fourth battalion for every regiment aroused particularly 
~4) Marquis de Sayve. 
(5) See above, Chap.III, note 19. 
(6) Gontaut, Ope cit., II, p.432. 
(7) This was the cUlmination of the work begun by Thiers. When, 
before the fall of the first I=resident of the third republic, 
representations were made to him from Berlin through the French 
ambassador there, that his activities at reorganization were 
considered excessive, and omen of a desire for revenge, he 
replied always: France must have a powerful army for her ~m 
inner good; and second: her place in the concert of nations 
116 
I 
I 
the animosity of Germany. The utterances of the German 
militarist party headed by von Moltke, made the amendment 
(7, cont~l-----------------------------------------------
demands that her military defense be on a sound basis; in 
this no other power whatsoever has any right of interference. 
The question of limitations of armaments was not treated in 
the Peace of Frankfort, b~ond specifications for the period 
of occupation. 
The work of reconstitution began at the close of the war, 
when the captured soldiers were liberated from the Prussian 
prisons. They were immediately marched to Versailles, and put 
under MacMahon's command. During t he session of April-August, 
1872, the army bill for a plan of military service s one of 
the principal measures before the Assembly. Thiers was in fa-
!our of a seven-year service; the Commission on this que stion 
ln favor of three, carrying out the militia idea. Nfive-year 
term on the principle of universal service was finally adopted 
after many debates, and hints from Germany that she viewed with 
alarm the contemplated extension of service. This law provided: 
five y ears in active army; four in reserve of same; five in 
territorial; four in reserve of same. No substitution; one 
half of each class,chosen by lot, to carry on work at home on 
unlimited leave; certain dispensations, or suspensions of call 
in case of students, professional men, or supporters of fam-
ilies. This is apparently modelled after the Prussian system. 
The Law of July 24,1873, provided for organization of the 
vast body of men made available by the action of the law of 
1872; stipulated methods of mobilization, and so forth. ~ac ahon 
was carrying on the work undertaken by his predecessor. 
The Staffs Law of March 13,1875, mentioned in t e text, 
was the sequel to a series of minor laws on reoxganization, 
passed during 1873-4; results of the indefatigable work of the 
Marshal, and of the Parliamentary Committees assisting him. 
In 1875 an estimate of the existing forces of Europe was 
made by M.Amedie LE Faure,in La France: 
Germany: with Reserves, Land strum, Landwehr, 
and navy, 1,700,000. Cost: 20,000,000 L. 
England: Including militia, volunteers, 
and navy: 535,000. Cost: 24,000,000 L. 
Austria: 535,000. Cost, 10,800,000 L. 
Russia:l,550,000. Cost, 27,200,000 L. 
France:l,700,000. Cost, 26,600,000 L. 
(Quoted in translation, Annual Register,1875, p.230.) This table 
explains the agitation cf Germany at the measures for a fourth 
battalion for every French regiment. 
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seem a threat, though it WaS in reality as much a redis-
tribution as a reenforcement. (8) 
Four week~ l ater the German ress took up what it 
considered to be the ohallenge. The Kolnische Zeitun~ 
April fifth, bu~st forth ith an extre~ely unfriendly 
article on the provooations offered Germany by the 
Fr nch character and policy . The ninth of A ril the 
Berliner Post brought out its famous leader: "Is ar in 
Prospect?" This rticle, after a revie of the situation 
at the moment, concluded, ar 1- in prosT- ct. he n xt 
da ,(tenth) the orddeutsche All ine Zeitun published 
a more cons rvative article, de reo tin the radioalis 
of the~, but ctu ly. Ith exe d1 t ct, eon i 
ing the im ression of an 1mmin nt, gray dang r (9) 
Gontaut hastened ac to B rlin; th Du e 
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Mission 
letters in an admirable tone of resignation, little hope-
ful , to his intimates; Hohenlohe said nothing. Gontaut's 
explanations and assurances seemed for the time to fall 
on listening ears, and so, on the fifteenth, the Emperor 
remarked to the Prince Polignac (10) "They have tried to 
make us quarrel, but now all is over; completely e~ded." 
The p ress, too adopted a milder tone; the Norddeutsche 
ZBitung quoting these woIds of the Emperor to the Prince. 
If this shortlived flurry in the press were 811, 
Europ e had never been aroused to the point of Russian 
intervention, and the "epistolatory reproaches of Queen 
Victoria." (11) But meanwhile that inveterate alarmist, 
Gontaut, had sent back to Paris full report of a con-
versation, which put the Duke Decazes as much on his 
guard as did the press utterances. Herr von Radowitz 
had been sent to st. Petersburg in February, in the 
absence of Prince Reuss. Bismarck's own statement of his 
aim in sending him leaves France little ground for inter-
preting the mission as a hostile one. The visit, accord-
ing to the Chancellor was in the ordinary course of di-
10 Military Attach6. Gontaut, 0t. oit. II, p.438. The use 
of the indefinite pronoun does not permit us to infer to whom 
the Emperor attributed the blame; except that his own innooence 
thereby asserts itself. It is probable that h e knew of t he French 
suspicion that he himself was in sympathy wtth the war party. 
(11) Decazes to Harcourt, April 9. Quoted Ranotaux,op.cit.III, 
p.212. 
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I Radow1tz on 
p1omaoy, and the ohoice fall upon Herr von Radowitz that 
he might free the German embassy from the embarrassing 
tradition of extraordinaryre1at ions to Prince Gortcha-
koff. (12) The French officials assumed, however, that 
Radowitz was to sound Russia as to her attitude in case 
of a german war with France. This view was current in 
St. Petersburg; Lefla was convinced, (13) and wrote to 
Paris to spread the news. After the press campaign was 
under way, Gontaut met Radowitz at "Lord Russell's, and 
demanded of htm why the German papers ~ersisted in 
'are 
such an attitude. Radowitz replied that Germany was 
bound to maintain the position she had gained, and----
this had a familiar Bismarcki811 ring in the ears of th e 
French ambassador----could not allow France to strike the 
first blow, when the French l~st for revenge reached its 
height. SuCh utterances as this, from a man of whom 
France was already suspicious, were received in Paris as 
of great weight. That this was excessive, appears not 
only from Bismarck's denials (14) but fran the very tone 
of the conversation as Gontaut reports it. (15) It 
(12 B.®'. O .. it.I1,p.190.T~e long existing 'c'ustQ;n ofC'-or{ch'akott 
ot communicating with Bismarck through the German embassy in St. 
Petersburg rather than the Russian embassy in Berlin,was the re-
Sult, according to Bismarck, of Gortchakoff's wish to appear a 
~ reat man before subordinat es, and vIas inconvenient to Germany. 
(13) laa? Radowitz denied the truth of this report;Leflo again 
asserted it. Gontaut, op. c.1;.I1. 464, note. 
(14) See below, page 1361 and note 41. (15) Gontaut, Ope cit. II, p.442-9. 
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ABril twenty-ninth and lt8¥ fifth; (18) nor by the in1.er-
view of Gontaut with von Bd1ow. The former conversa-
tions were the result of the initiative of the German 
ambassador, and the first of them • in which Hohenlohe 
was the listener, Decazes the crator, was of a more re-
assuring tone than the second. Hohen1ohe was just about 
to depart for Berlin, so that the interviews took on 
the character of SUbjects for first hand reports to 
Bis:rn.arck. On Kay fifth Hohenlohe told Decazes of a 
letter from BiSlTl arck which seemed to wish to make the 
pOint that Germany was not alarmed for the ~ediate 
future, yet would not have it thought thatthe new mil-
itary law could go into effect without protest. Next, 
Hohenlohe outlined a letter from Bismarck, which Decazes 
inferred to be the real mot ive force behind this second 
Visit from the ambassador. The leter suggested "that we 
(marl) must seek a common ground upon Which we can stand 
together;" (19) and brought up the subject of the Eastern 
question, with the observation that there France end 
Germany had no conflicting interests. What was the 
(18) l!2.1,g •• -II, 451-3; 457-60. 
(19) l£ig .• IJ, p.459. 
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purpose of all this? No wonder that the Duo DeoazeB was 
puzzled, and wrote commissioning Gontaut to seek en-
lightenment wherever possible. What oould not appear so 
plainly to him as to us, was ,that Bismarck probably had 
no such intention of mystification, as Hohenlohe succeed-
ed in effecting. Hohenlohe's ideal was a significant 
reserve in diplomacy; a half-suggestive, half-evasive 
attitude which at such a time as this was unexpectedly 
alarming. These conversations adduced by Gontaut to 
prove that Bismarck wished to alarm France, seem to me to 
prOVe that he did!l2.i. in.tend to let matters go too far; 
that he was aoting on no new policy iVhatever. He was 
maintaining his old threat, and at the same time givi~ 
indication of a wish to sound his ancient enemy along 
more than one line. What he said to Hohenlohe seems to 
me to be something like this: "The opportunity to catch 
French diplomaoy unawares has presented itself to you, 
Make such use of it as you can t to find out just rihera 
we at and. " 
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Gontaut's interviews with the German secretary of 
state on the seventh of May, had no more satisfactory 
outcome. After some mention by von B~low of Marshal 
von MQltke's theory of the military future, he pro-
ceeded t .o speak of "an interview which Prinoe HohenlohE; 
on instruction from the Cahncellor, had with Your 
Exoellenoe (Decazes) today; but in suoh general and 
obscure terms, that I really could not tell what fm-
pression the Berlin Cabinet had derived from it. I 
could hardly understand-------whether it was about 
the proposal or the possibility of an understanding of 
our two oountries about oertain questions at present 
of secondary rank, as for example Eastern policy-------
But as I said, Herr von B~low expressed himself with so 
little clearness that I could not understand whether 
the conversat ion which might have taken suoh a turn. 
a~tually did so or not:" (20) 
There was surely,at all events,no particularly 
affrighting element in such a oonversation,and I think, 
this corroborates the theory enunoiated above;'that the 
german government was not pursuing a predetermined policy 
(20) Orloff. ~uoted ~.328 
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sions. 
of special alarm, but that Gontaut and Decazes. under 
the influence of that intimidation which Bismarck had 
for five years wrought in France, were looking for some-
thing which did not exist. However this may have been, 
the popular excitement in both countries, accompanied by 
uncertainty in financial operations, continued. 
Before inquiring further into the German motives, it 
would be well to survey the effect of the agitation in 
other countries. In what manner Russia was concerned 
with ~ranch and German destinies had been pointed out. 
e 
Here was the test of the Three Emperors' Alliance, and 
on the other hand, of French trust in Russia, rea~ and 
recognizable. It was a Russian who said of Bismarck in 
connection with war scares: WWer kann Wiesen, was er 
plant?" (21) Bismarck was probably justified , to some 
degree, in his suggestion that Gortchakotf thought of 
the situation as a chance to gratify his own vanity. 
The Russian Chancellor during the month of April 
held several conversations with General LefIo, the 
French ambassador to St. Petersburg. The bearing of 
(21) Orloff. ~uoted~. 328. 
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Gortchakpff was such that Leflo, on his visit to Paris 
early in April, was quite convinced of the needlessness 
of his government's alarm. But so contagious was this 
s tate of mind, that on his return to St.Petersburg he 
told Gortchakoff (April 10 ) as his own opinion, as well 
a s that of the European world, that"war was in prospect." 
Gortchakoff resented Bismarck's preponderance---rather 
than Germany's preponderance!---in Europe. Though he 
knew the strength of the bond between Rus siCll and German 
Emperors, ha was confident of his own dip10m~tic abil-
ities. He probably believed firmly that the matter would 
not come to an open break, which would be finally destru~ 
tive to the Three Emperors' Alliance. So he took the 
course that appealed to him, and told Leflo first, that 
the danger was not so great as was f ~ared; and second, 
that Russia's disapproval would confron t Bismarck if the 
matter were carried :t'urther. The Czar himself (April 15) 
repeated these two assertions, with more emphasiS, as 
was natural, on the first point than the second. "I am 
convinced," was t he S9nse of his words, "that Germany 
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The Due Decaz felt th t his mo~ nt h d com. ~h 
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On the fifth and sixth of May, Count Peter 
Schouvaloff (26) was in Eerlin, and conversed with the 
Cerman Chancellor. According to his own statements he 
represented the opinion of the RU8sian court that an 
anti-French feeling had been unwarrantably instigated 
in Germany, and that Russia herself would prevent any 
further heckling of France. This (from the same source 
we learn) met with the astonishment of Bismarck. Five 
days later Gortchakoff, accompanying Alexander the second, 
was in Berlin. This visit tad been planned as were those 
other royal-visits of the preceding years J as a frjendly 
demonstration. But the intensity of the time focussed 
every eye upon Berlin~ Europe waited in expectancy for 
the outcome of those interviews of the tenth of ilC\)' and 
the days immed1a;cely following. What went on behind the 
doors which guarded the interview of the two Chancellors, 
has not been divulged. All that we know is what Gortcha-
kaff said to Gontaut May eleventh: "Bismarck's attitude 
is friendly; he desir~s no war; and reco6nizes the neces-
sity of measures for Frenc4 army reorganization." (27) 
(26) See above, Chap. I, note 43. 
(27) Gontaut, OPt cit .• II, pp.490-95. 
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England 
This, and Bismarck's statement that Gortchakoff "dated 
from this place a telegraphic circular destined for 
publicat ion, beg1nning with the words t "lfaintenant 1a 
paix est assuree'," (28) are our directest evidences •. 
If Gortchakoff actually believed. as he probably 
did, that peace was now assured after an interval of 
real instability,he. eould hardly claim. nevertheless, 
the full thanks. If European int ~rvent ion avert ed a 
war, it was due to England, hardly less> than Rus s ia. 
In London, M. Charles Gavard, in the absence of the 
minister, took charge of the French embassy on March 
tWenty-aecond. As late as April eighth--the day preced-
ing the startling ~ artic1e---Gavard met no response 
fro~ Lord Derby when he referred to alarming indications 
of B i srnarck' 8 rag e toward the ent ire cont i nent. (29) Lord 
Derby remained "quite without anxiety.~ and expressed the 
view that Bismarck was playing a game to intimidate his 
opponents in domestic affairs. "He has got his hands 
full with the Catholic Church--------Germany sees a 
coalition in everything. and wishes to conjure it away." 
~281 Bismarck, op.cit •• II, p.191. 
(29) Gavard referred not only to the order against the ~xpor­
tation of horses, but to the appeal of Bismarck to the Italian 
Law of Guaranties; and more particularly to the notes addressed 
to Belgium. The B3lgian question touched England more nearly 
than the French, geographically, dynastically, and---with es-
pecial force---commercially. 
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The press of London, however, did not preserve this same 
enviable detachment, nor philosophic calm. The English 
pres s had no suoh oonneotion with the government as made 
every utteranoe of the leading German papers worthy of 
remark. European disturbances whioh the English govern-
ment failed to recognize. met with unfavourable comment 
in t he newspapers; and on the tenth of April, after the 
Poal article of the ninth, there was a general outbreak 
of excitement, and in some sort, of consternation. The 
English people seemed to have the feelir.g that Bismarck 
was up to something which was just a little bit beyond 
the range of English interes~ and consequently difficult 
t o understand; yet which was by no means trivial. On the 
twelfth this feeling found utterance in an inquiry in 
Parliament.not as to the German intentions against France, 
but as to the German notes to Belgium. The question c~e 
up again on the nineteenth, and on the twentieth Gavard 
and Lord Derby discussed Bismarck's motives in this case--
the two diplomats steering clear of any reference to 
France. 
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On the tWenty-eighth of April the Frenoh aoting min-
ister"was a b it more insistent. He tried to oonvinoe Lord 
Derby---a thankless task in any case,---of the importanoe 
of knowing "the purpose of these experiments of all 
sorts,---- spreading alarm throughout EUrope." The re-
markable doctrine which the Englishman propounded in 
this convers ation (30) granted that a storm seemed to be 
approaching, but assumed that it was to be direoted 
against Austria! Bismarck, thought Lord Derby, would 
"reproaoh Austria for making alliances." 
Little satisfaction here, so far, for Franoe. But 
Gavara was not to give up tile task r::f oVerooming the seem-
ing sluggishness of the English governmen~. On ~ril 
thirtieth he received full instructions from Paris, with 
extracts from Gontaut's correspondence, and a report of 
the so-called "Radowi~z dootrine" of the advan~age to 
Germany of imminent a~tack. After an intervie" .... based on 
these revelations, Dvrby still clung to his fixed idea, 
but did conoede the existence of grounds for alarm so far 
as to say that Russia might influence Bismarck to be 
(30) In which conviction he was evidently not alone, for Gavard 
refers to an article in the speotator on this same theme----
ei~her inspired by Derby, or wri~ten by someone of similar 
persuasions. 
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lenient to Fran ce, "110 more than England," said Gavard, 
as he was ins~ructed to say. 
A week later RIlgland had made the overtures which 
France desired. (32) For on the sixth of MfW the Times 
published an article from its Paris correspondent. Y. de 
Blowitz (33) describing the excitement, reporting the 
war rumours, and' s~ing little about the probable source. 
In Germany the government suggests, the press responds; 
in Eq;land, one can almost go so far as to say that the 
opposite hOlds true. On the same day that this Paris 
letter was pUblished, tbe Editorial column offered the 
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(32) On the sixth of May SOhouvaloff went on to London. On this 
same d~ Lord Derby reported to Gavard what Odo Russell had said 
of Bismarck: that he wished not war, but a war scare. May 9, 
telegram from Russell reporting the Czar's peaceful counsel. 
This same da~e telegram from Hohenlone to M~ns~er, informing 
h~ of the activ1ti~ of the English ambasqaaor in Berlin. 
(See text) It is di~ioult to tell exactly w~n Russell saw 
the German officials; Whether before or after the sixth of 
M~. when the English government had ~he impetus of the Times 
article and of Sohouvaloffts arrival. We majf int'er that it was 
after, since Derby did not tell Gavard of Bismarck's telegram 
of tnanks until May 11. (Monday). The Annual Regis~er asserts 
that Ruseell saw Bismarck the tenth, Sunday. 
(33) This article according to Gavard, was wri~ten "at the 
instance of the Duc Decazes." (p,24o) The le~ter in his cor-
respondence gives the impression that he was not responsible, 
and the Moniteur expressly denied the effic ial responsibility. 
There is a note in Hohenlohets journal describing an inter-
View with de B.J.owitz, in whichthe points treated in the Times 
article were touched upon. The fact, howeveri that the tone 
of the article was such that it finally resu ted in something 
of a revulsion of feeling against Germany is a fairly oood 
reason for thinking that Hohenloheta inspiration was not the 
pr~ry source of the artiole. The Duc Decazeo probably rec-
ognized the effect such an article would have, and encouraged 
de Blowitz. 
• 
sugg est ion that the probable origin of the rumours "'if ---
probed deeply enough---would be found in the oareless 
blustering of Prussian soldiers, in the strange reckless-
ness of the Berlin press, in some empty menaoes let fall 
by statesmen who place great relianoe on the diplomatio 
value 01' fear." This was followed on the eighth by the 
ed1~orial inferenoe that -these apprehensions-----appear 
to be rather ail induotion fran a variety of oircumstances, 
most of them 1nevi table, than to ari 3e from anything whim 
is even remotely the act of "the German government. " The 
artiole of this date wen~ on to a~tribut~ the bitterness 
as muoh to F.rance as to Germany, and to emphasize the 
entirely unoffioial character of the utteranoes of the 
German war party. On the tenth, however, the Times took 
the next step, and ass~rted: "The statesmen of Berlin 
cannot be ~quitted of all blame for this mischievous 
scare." It is easy to see where English public opinion 
Was tending. 
Meanwhile Lord Derby had. reported to Gavard that Odo 
Russell had tendered to good offioes of the English gov-
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ernment in Berlin; and M~nster (34) had heard from 
HOhenlohe of this "laughable anxiety" for peace. Derby 
received a telegram fran Bismarck after the Czar's ar-
rival in Berlin, thanking him for England's off~r of 
"kind and unneoessary services." (35) It was the four-
teenth that Gortchakoff's circular telegram was sent. 
The extent to which England had been shaken by the 
European disturbances is shown by the fact that Queen 
Viotoria had written personally to the Emperor, in the 
interests of peace. England had octually come to feel, 
t hen, that intervention---dread word---was neoessary. 
Schouvaloff, of course, was rejoiced; since he assumed 
that England had followed the lead of Russia. The ex-
planations of the English government were greeted "with 
cheers" in the Commons also. The Times itself (May 12 ) 
reviewing the course of the exoitement, and mentioning 
again its thesis of the inevitable bitterness between 
the two countries, concluded: mwho cannot see that we 
are likely to have a "soare" every six monthe or oftener~" 
There was need---so ran the article---of some powerf\.ll 
(34) German ambassador to England. From Hohenlohe,op,cit.II, 
p.156-? , 
(35) Gaval"d. Opt cit. p. 247. 
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external influence,such as the Emperor of Russia, and, 
though this is not explicitly stated, the ~ueen of 
England, might exert. 
England and Russia, then, felt that they had saved 
the peace of Europe. France as a whole felt that Germany 
had. desired war,_ and was animated by extraordinary bit-
terness. (36) The Duc Decazes with his accustomed subtle-
ty, inferred that Bismarck did not want war, but a war 
scare. (3'1) What was Bismarck's avn testimony in the 
ma'tter? 
Perfectly conscious that he was under censure, 
Bismarck, during the visit of the Czar, was quite ob-
viously in a bad temper, if we may believe Gont aut. It 
is a vivid picture that Gontaut presents to us: of the 
Chancellor in his wrath and pride alienating Italy, 
Belgium, the clergy; directing "coarse lunges against 
France; France meanwhile earnestly and prayerfully hoping 
for peace and qUiet. But it must not be fOIgotten 'that 
Gontaut's despatches fram the only detailed portrayal of 
the daily events available; o'ther statements---the Times, 
(37) The opinion which was shared by Odo Russell. See Gavard OPe c1t,pp.243-5. 
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Denials 
Gavard's narrative, Hohenlohe's surprisingly reticent 
word or two---are only ~ragrnentary. Gontaut was by 1875 
personally antagonistic to Bismarck, with the aggrava-
tions of four years of little humiliations. ~d we evi-
dance from Hohenlohe to counterbalance Gontaut' s. we 
might accept the latter with less of mental reservation. 
But Hohenlohe was wholly silent on the subject all 
through ~ril. and indeed, up to his telegram of May 
ninth. (38) 
Bismarok h~self, in his autobiography, in a speech 
before the Reichstag, in a letter to the Emperor, and in 
conversations, denied entirely that he was responsible 
, 
for the war rumours. (39) He attributed them (a) to 
Gortchakoff's je~lousy, and Gontaut's enmity, together; 
(b) to the ill-will of the Empress and the circle of 
ladies about her. Both ideas are consistent with his 
usual habit of thought. (40) But the autobiography, no 
more than a speech before the Reichstag, is hardly a non-
partisan document. (41) It was to his interest to repre-
sent his own culpability as a t.igment of non-German 
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(38)On this point Dreux has a note(Gontaut.o~cit,!I,;.534)that 
Hohenlohe ma..v have been kept in ignorance of Is plans by the Chao~ellort ThiA is deCidealYiunvotnV1naing'tThe 5amelQ~@ntator in~~at~s ha~ Honenlohe 1n n s no e or b~p ~Der ~, ~.,O,\H II ~.17l-2)referred to Bismarck's guilt. The note read ~s follows! 
And he will not Oncede that anyone but the lDnpres8 shares the 
guilt. Dreux' inf~r3nce seems wholly ~nWhar!entaole to me, in view 
of the tone pf the note as a whole a alt ou~~ th~ elderJ.y ambassa-dor d?es not confeos that h~ "founa difficulty 1n following Bis-
marck s argument." (39) See B.~O¥.Cit,II.Pp.188-95.POltRedtVi,pP.333-55. Hohenlohe 
OPt c1 t. II ,pp. '11-'2. Anliang ----Errinnerungen: II ,#271. • 
(40)The feeling toward Gortchakoff and Gontaut has been amllly illus-
trated On the opposition offered h~ by the Kaiserin see Hohenlohe II~p.ll0.Bisrnarok,II.p.126.Gontaut,rI,p.635.Busch,Secretd,II.pp . • t2U -, 151. eto11et.c. I ) 41 See Bib ography,D. (Appendix A below. 
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imaginat ion. The very fact that explanat ions before 
the ~eichBt ag were necessary, indicat es that all of 
Germany was far from sympathizing with the war party. (42) 
The crisis in its entirety, it is eVident, was very 
largely preCipitated and fostered in the press, English, 
French, and German. It was the K~lnische Zeitung and 
the Berliner Post which first voiced the agitation, and 
the Norddeutsche Zeitung which showed restraint. it vlill 
be remembered. After the visit of the Czar--indeed. on 
May ninth, the day of his arrival itself, as well as 
later, the latter organ adopted a tone of perfeot peace-
fulness, holding to the theme that nothing had happened 
to disturb the peaceful r~lations between France and 
Germany. (43) The DeutSChe Allgemeine Correspondenz, 
while conceding that the crisis was past, gavs warning 
that military measures in France would continue to re-
ceive the watchfulness of Germany. AccordIng to the 
analysis of press relations made by Bismarck, (44) none 
of these journals was "offiCial." Official character 
was limited to the Provincial Correspondenz,and to ad-
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(-12) See also Anhang,I ,#286-8. 1l1ttnacht to Bismarck of the re-
organization of the diplomatio committee of the Reichstag,sinoe 
that body was lately limited to conflicting newspaper reports 
o~ so vast and vHal a matter as the possibility of war. 
(43) See the Times Uay 12. quotations !rom fc r..:ign pres8jAn,Reg. 
1875; p.2l9. (44) In the speech before thE Relchstag,1876. See above, note 39. 
I 
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Conclus_ 
ions. 
vertisements. Because a miniser is known once to have 
looked through an editorial of some paper, that organ is 
forever after regarded as directly inspired, said Bis-
marok. In spite of these denials, we know that none of 
the supposedly offending papers were of the opposition, 
and that Bismarck could have checked them if he so de-
sired. ~uch an attitude as that of the Berliner Post 
on ~ril ninth, coUid never have dared risk his disap-
proval. Indeed, in the very speech on the press, re-
ferred to, he admitted that the ~ article was not 
gro~ndless; that every thinking man must cono de that 
the lust for revenge in France would be strengthened by 
the rapid reconstitution of the army. 
From the foregoing evidence it seems possible to 
draw the following conclusions: (a) That Bismarck did 
not desire war, nor did the Duc Decazes. 
(b) That Bismarck was 
acting along the line of that policy of intim-
idation pursued by htm since 1871, in allowing 
the press alarm subsequent to the French mil-
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itary laws. 
(c) That he had no intention, 
however J of' allowing the matter to go farther 
than the affail.' of the Pastoral letters, for 
example, and was as astounded as he was an-
noyed at the arousing of European ala~.(45) 
(d) That this very stimulation 
of European sentiment was to the interest of, 
and largely due to, the Due Decazes. 
(e) That Gortch~off was eager 
for a chance to displ~ his own importance, and 
interfered partly fram this motive, partly be-
cause of a desire to take a step toward a 
Franco-Russian policy to which the Emperor of 
Russia could not 60 entirely accede. (46) 
The crisis past, what is the result? Decazes se~d 
to have made a start toward the goal he had looked for; 
n~ssian alliance. Bismarck, unexpectedly to himself , had 
learned that he could not browbeat Franoe with impur.ity 
forever. Both goverrunent s, by force of o1roumstanc • 
(45)necazes attributed Bismarck's talk of resigning to sulk 
brought about by the European exhortations. As a metter of fact, 
Bismarck's first suggestion of resignation at this time as made 
May 4,Anhapg,lt#266-7. This was before the Czar's visit or Odo 
Russell's. 
(46) The "sem1-0~f1ctal" despatch from St.Peter3bure spoken of 
in An,Reg.1875,p.220,contai.11.b tl: informatior. tr.at Rt:.ssia had 
delivered no note to the Berlin government, and th~ the Czar as 
oonvinced of the Kaiser's peaceful sentiments, should not be for·· 
gotten. 
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and still more, of habit, had looked upon each step, 
heard each word, of tIl e other J far more seriously than 
there was need. Had war burst out in 1875, it would 
have been not the result or any provocation of one gov-
ernment to the other, but the expression of a deep, 
slow-moving, and enduring force: the traditional opposi-
tion of the interests of the countries on either side of 
the Rhine. 
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Conclusion. 
After 1875. 
As the Kulturkampf was the focus of German atten-
tion during the first five years of the decade beginning 
with the Feace of Prankfort~ so, in the summer of 1875, 
the Eastern question comes to be the centre fo!' the re-
mainder of t~ e period. The outbreak of trouble in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina turned the eyes of all Europe away from 
the attenuated hostilities of the Western nations, to 
the horr i:fying conflicts in the Balkans. Here. as Bismarck 
had earlIer in the year nommissioned Hohenlohe to say to 
Decazes, France and Germany could have no violently con-
flicting interests, and might even act in concert. In 
spite of the new strength and oourage with which France 
viewed her future, after the favorable demonstrations 
which Russia had given her in the spring, she had still 
little weight in the counsels of Europe, and this she 
knew. What she had gained by the Russian support and 
the English rebuke to Bismarck, was the right to be left 
alone. 
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Following the path of French and German relationship 
through the tortuous maze of international complications, 
we find it blocked out only indirectly. France did not 
forget per problem of the years up to 1875; indeed, the 
Duc Decazes confessed it on his mind, while he was de-
ter.mining the policy of France in the period before the 
outbreak of the Eastern war. (1) Bismarck had trained 
his opponent so well that the Duke was reduced not only 
to circumspection, but to a sort of suspension. (2) 
Bismarck, too, gave frequent hints that he was not 
forgetting his age-long enemy. Such were the German 
press comments on the politics of French parties . (3) and 
the urgency of Bismarck through Hohenlohe, that Gontaut 
be recalled. This recall, which took place Januar,y fifth, 
1878, was an excellent omen for the stability of Franco-
Fer.man relations, since the ill-feeling of the Chancellor 
for the monarchical and Catholic ambassador was always 
likely to affect the feeling of the Chancellor for 
France as a whole. (4) This tension between the two has 
been too abundantly illustrated throughout this paper 
(l)See Gontaut, op,cit.II,p,542. ~ar from clatming a leading 
role for France in these dangerous proceedings which neither 
his interest,nor his position at the time allowed,he as only 
Conc rned to do all he could for the maintenance of unanimity, 
80 much did he fear lest Prince Bismarck could Use the cQmpli-
cations and the conflict threatening Europe,against us. "{Drieux) 
(2) See despatch to Gontaut,ibid,pp.557-560, 
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(3) Ibid,II,Chapter IV entir~sch,op,cit.II,pp.174-5. 
Bisma.rok's speech in Reichstag.lPol. Red. XII ,pp. 169-212. (11 Jan. '87) 
(4) Gontau~ op.cit,II,Chapter vIII. 
to require eluoidation here. 
The maxim upon whioh Bismarok had built his whole 
polioy toward Franoe was that yranoe held no terrors for 
Germany so long a8 she remained without allies. France 
had reoognized the truth of this, but until 1875 had 
been unable to aot upon it. After this date, the fear 
that Eastern affairs would afford France the opportunity 
so far denied her, harrassed German statesmanship in the 
midst of these preoccupations. rt was to be expected 
that France and Russia would draw together openly, after 
the "oervioe" of the latter in May. Deoazes had been 
jubilant at that time about the Russian support afforded 
him. But he had not reokoned on any neoessity for the 
payment of a debt of gratitude, and Russia, in her ex-
citement and her difficulties in the last six months or 
1875, and in 1876, was a little too tmportunate. France 
was in no position to be drawn into a struggle; better 
to put off the d~ of c~entjng her foreign alliances, 
than to risk taking part in any hostilities in which 
she had no direct end to gain. During 1876,thereforo, 
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there grew up a certain coolness betweenFrance and 
RUBS la, (5) risirlg very largely out of Gortohakoff' s 
tactics. This could not fail to be apparent to Germany, 
an d as the months went on. her vig flance relaxed. 
It must be remembered that the Kulturkampf, shifted 
fram the centre of attention as it was by more pressing 
questions, did not end with lA75. The repulSion of the 
German government from anything that savored of Ultra-
montanism continued to affect rela tions with the ~rench. 
Out of this grew a noteworthy development: the favour 
shown by Bismarck to the Radical party in France. One of 
the Catholic ministers remarked: "And they prefer to us--
l!y Heaven!--the Radicals! tt Such was actually the case, in 
so far as Bismarck made it clear that he regarded the con-
tinued triumphs of the ultra-conservative party as direct-
ly menacing to Germany; but the Radicalism which he 
smiled upon had little in common with that whioh set up 
the Commune in 1871. The proj ected visit of Gambetta to 
Berlin for an interview with Bismarck, in the latter 
months of 1877 and early in 1878 (6) seemed for a day to 
(5) Ibid. Iv, Chapt er V: 
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(6)Anhang----Erinnerungen 11,#309. The letter of Count Herbert 
Bismarck,Oct.30,'?7; #2.See Gambettafs comment on Bfs speech 
in Reichstag, Feb.19,l878, quoted Hanotaux, Iv, p.258: There 
now rises within the man the radiant dawn of rightful dealing." 
prophecy that prance might at last emerge free of the 
shadow of Clericalism whioh Germany saw always h4Wer-
ing near. In a lett er of Count Herb ert Bism:arck to the 
common friend who proposed the meeting, Bim~~rck's con-
victions and political vi~{s are set forth at length; 
the pacific intent ions of Germany; the fear -, of clerical-
ism; the belief that France also was largely pacific; the 
belief that a Restoration would inevitably mean attack on 
Germany. An outstanding phrase of this letter reads: WWe 
• 
need and wish for no war with lrance. and we also believe 
that there is no reason why it must of necessity br eak 
out, so long as the Pope is npt. supreme ther». There 
was no new element here which was not introduced into a 
hundred diplo~tic interviews in the first years after 
the close of the war; no point of protest which was not 
made before the fall of Thiers. The point of difference 
lies in th~ildness of tone, as co~pared with the tone 
of diplomatic communications of Germany to France 
during and immediately after the period of occupation. 
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The visit never took place; and indeed, it was a danger-
ous plan, from the point of view of Gambetta's position 
in France. But the motive which prompted it was the tell-
ing thir~. Bismarck seemed to be willing at last for a 
better modus vivendi with France. 
This was just before the Berlin Congress. France 
took part in the series of diplomatic skirmishes which 
go by that name, but without hesitation. Gambetta, think-
ing for hjs country, dared to acknowledge that he was 
af raid. But the- part which the country actually played, 
was nothing if not creditable; inconspicuous, but grate-
fully so, since to be conspicuous in the Congress meant " 
to be under the ce~seless, pierci~ regard of the great 
dictator of the group. France being neither capable nor 
desirous of any independent policy, her assent served as 
a balance wheel, and in consequence she found herself 
treated with more consideration than she had known since 
the days of Napoleon the Third. The accepted traditions 
of those still somewhat mysterious negotiations isthat 
Lord Salisbury, the English representative, said to 
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Waddington, of prance: "Do as you please in Tunis." This 
was in connection witih English colonial policy, especial-
ly in Cyprus. (7) But the suggestion could hardly have 
come from Salisbury without the sanction of Bismarck, 
and political historians unite in interpreting it as 
the direct outcome of Bismarck's own idea that to turn 
France loose in Tunis was, in the first place, to streng-
then German relat ions with Italy, which would turn to 
Germany in self-defense; and in the second, to divert the 
attention of prance from European affairs, and her near 
neighbor. 
The Congress finally marked the return of France to a 
position independent of Germany; and the persuasion of 
Germany that to reign in one great country was not for 
long compatible with reigning over her nearest enemy! 
After the Congress, each o~ the two very distinctly took 
up her own burdens, and went her own way. The feverish 
period was over. But this was not the only result of 
~portance for this ~articular international situation. 
It also threw light upon the instability of the Three 
. (7) So far as we know the reservation stipulated by France at 
the very b eg1nning of the Congress--that Egypt should not be 
d1scussed--was not violated. 
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Emperors' Alliance, by bringing into olear relief the 
fUndamental differences 1n the interests of the three 
i mperial oourts. Hence, after the Congress, although 
the understanding which had ostensibly existed intact 
since 1872, (1n spite of Russia's backing of prance in 
1875) was not explicitly repudiated, its hollowness 
was expos ed. "Put not your trust in Emperors." might 
well have been Bismarck's text. 
Wilth P"'ance rficovered, or well :-ecovering, and the 
unity of the three central European nations disturbed, 
the necessity for some new strengthening of his position 
was brought home to Bismarck; and out of this necessity 
grew the Dual Alliance of 1879, with Austria, which in 
1882, by the addition of Italy became the Triple Alliance. 
Bismarck's own statement of his policy and motives is 
more illuminati1'¥!: than any other could be. (~) He states 
first (Jf all: 
(a) That his first idea of a Triple Alli arlce 
was such an one $\S might have grown out of the 
meeting of the Three Emperors; with the addi-
(8) Bismarck, OPe ci~. J II, Cha.pter xXIX. 
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( 
many: 
~ion or "monarchic Italy." 
(b) That ' the stumbling blocks in the way Were 
(1) Russia's policy toward France; the "'imit 
beyond which" the weakening of France would not 
be allowed to go; R.nd (~) the differences in 
the interests of the three powers in regard to 
thA Eastern question. 
He then analyzes the necessity of alliance for Ger-
(c) Two great European powers having been beat-
en in the field. could but be desirous of re-
(d) Old elaments in Austria still surviving, the 
ancient rivalry for the leadership of Germany 
might again become a factor in Austrian policy. 
(e) The secret convention of Reichatadt (9) 
evidenced the possibility of a Franco-Austro-
RUssian alliance, since France would inevitably 
join a coalition against Aermany. 
(9) The secret meeting of Russian and Austrian diplomats, in 
July, 1875, which was a plan of Gortchakoff'&. At this meeting 
RUSSia and Austria agreed to act together, and independent of 
Germany, if need be, in order to secttre the ends hich each 
sought in the ~ st. It was later ~sserted by Bismarck that the 
division of things ~fter the Russo-Turkish war, and in partic-
ular the annexation of the Eastern provinces by Austria, was 
on the basis of this convention. 
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In making her choice of possible allies, Germany must be 
gu~ded by the following considerations: 
(f) That the constitution. of !n£l~s prevents 
any alliance with her on a sure footing, since 
one government may adopt an entirely different 
policy from that of its predecessor. 
(g) That Italy would not promise sufficiont 
counterppise to an alliance of the other three 
powers (i.e.France, Russia, and Austria) even 
were she free from Feench and Austrian influ-
ence. 
(h) That Ru.!!si,a would give Germany the advant-
age o~ material force, and of the ancient tra-
dition of 1ynastic friendship. 
(i) That Austrian alliance would satisfy all 
.. - --
German parties in some sort; the Catholics, 
obviously; the Conservatives, because of What 
he calls the "conservative nimbus" of the 
Austrian name; that this alliance would carry 
on the t mdition of the Holy Roman :Empire'that 
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it would fill the need of decisive measures 
against RUBsia. The difficulties t on the other 
hand t with an Austrian alliance t would be the 
imperfect appreciation of political possibili-
ties by the German element in Austria; the re-
ligious question, and the possibility of a rap-
prochement of France and Austria on the basis 
of their common Catholicism; the Polish ques-
tion, in which Russia mjght induce Austria to 
give up Galicia, for compensation on the Iranube, 
while Prussian Poland could not be abandoned by 
Prussia -without danger to the state itself. 
(j) That "to all who knew the. history and char-
acter of the Gallic race, it was obvious that 
that power (i.e. Germany's .!'ollY) could never 
be France." (10) 
On the ~strian side, also, there was need of sup-
port; if A~stria sought this fram Russia, Germany would 
be left isolated on the continent, because of her rela-
tion with trance. If Austria turned to France and possi-
(IO) Bismarck, op. citA II, p.255. 
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bly England, Germany would be forced to subject herself 
to the Russian alliance, with its dangerous implication 
of common action on points in which Germany had no in-
terest. Ther efore, Bismarck made the choice of Austria, 
and undertook the negotiations of 18?9, between Austria 
and Germany, which resulted in the Treaty of Alliance 
of October seventh, 18?9. (11) This treaty, published 
in 1888, was lergely directed toward defence against 
Russia, and we find most writers dealing with the Triple 
Alliance as distinctly intnnded for this purpose, with 
the inference that Germany's greatest danger in the last 
years of the nineteenth century was from her neighbor on 
the north. 
But as to this last, we have Bismarck's contrary 
statement. He mentions the existence of an analgous tre~ 
of the two powers for defense against ~rance, not pub-
lished at the time of publication of the agreement for 
defense against RussiA. Although admitting that the al-
liance does not provide the same defense against France 
as against Russia, Bismarck attributed this to the fact 
(11) Hertslet, State Papers, Vol.?3.p.2?O. 
( 
I 
I 
f 
that AUstria was not threatened by the Western country, 
and even had some basis for common action with her. (12) 
The Alliance as a whole, therefore, was more advantage-
ous to Austria than to Germany, for Bismarck specifical-
ly says that Germany is primarily threatened by a Ftt"ench 
war, and suffers her greatest danger on her Western 
frontier, "by reason of the aggressive, plundering in-
stincts of the French people." (13) 
Here is the underlying theme of this period of 
Franco-German relations, clearly expressed. These rig-
ours and petty exactions, these constantly recurring 
difficulties, had more behind them than the fact of the 
War of 1870. To Bismarck, this underlying motive was op-
posi tion to the "aggressive, plundering instincts;" to 
the French, it was the preservation of the balanct of 
power, and the diminution of t he overwhelming aggrand-
izement of Germany. It is for t his reason that the re-
lations between France and Germany have almost al ays, 
and especially since the War of 1870, been a "latent 
state of war." The wonder is not that France has at 
(12) See above, page 149. (13) B., op_ cit. II, p.279. It 1s important to note, also, 
that Italy came' into the a l liance in 1882 because of her 
grievance---not against Russia---but against France. 
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last joined Russia in an attack primarily occasioned by 
the Balkan situation, but that peace has been preserved 
between the two, and colonial and commercial projects 
allowed to develop with so little hindrance, until t he 
last years. Though pacificists may advance every plaus-
ible argument to convince the world that there is no 
fundamental opposition of the German to the French tem-
perament, the fulfilment of Bismarck's prophecy of war 
"When France has recovered" is being enacted before us. 
(14) When the struggle is over, who can say what will 
take the place of Bismarck's great work, the Triple 
Alliance? There are no more Bismarck's now, in our in-
dustrialized and commercialized world. Perhaps we are 
watching t h e death struggle of the old world which made 
the policy of a Bismarok po ssi ble; which made "all treat-
ies of peace provisional, and dependent on conflict- or 
the mere wish to avoid it. (15) The idealists would have 
us believe it. 
14 Bismarck in the Reichstag, Jan.ll,1887: ft France is like an 
engine which is filled up with steam to the point of explosion, 
and a: spark, a clumsy movement of the r and, may suffice to cause 
this explosion---to bring on war. However, the spark is so care-
fully tended that it seems at first sight that it ill never be 
used for causing a conflagration in the neighboring country.-
Pol. Red. XII, p.190. 
(15) See above, page 3. 
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Appendix A. 
Critical Bibliography 
of works bearing on 
this period and topic. 
Brief Bibliography 
of works bearing om th1s period 
and topio. 
A. Offioial Publications, and Compilations of Same. 
Arohives Diplomatigues.Recueil de Diplomatie et 
D'histoire. 
Yearly. Paris. Treaties, protocols, de-
spatches, speeches. 
Hansard, T.C.ParliamentatY Debates.Series three, 
1830-83. 
Hertslet,Sir Edward. Map of Europe by Treaty.London. 
Vol.three, 1814-75. 
Her tslet,Sir Edward, State Papers of England and 
Others. Vol.62,187l-82. London. 
Journal Officiel.de la Republigue FranQais. Vols. 
1870-75. Six numbers each. Official 
reports of the acts of the ASsembly, 
and stenographic reports of the de-
bates. General political news. 
#Reoueil des Trait!s etc. relatife ! la x aved 
l'Allemagne. 
Paris. Imprimerie Nationale. Five Vols. 
1879. 
# Inaccessib1e he ~e. 
I 
B. Memoirs and Contemporary Accounts. Documents. 
Aegidi,L.K.J., und Klauhold, Alfred. (Eds) ~ 
Staa tsarchi.~ • 
II 
Vols. eighteen to forty. Annual. 
Diplomatic no t es, speeches in various 
national assemblies, newspaper articles, 
treaties and protocols, speeches from 
the throne, proclamations. 
Anhang enthaltend die in der Untersuchungssache 
wider den Grafen von ~im, in Laufe der 
~ffentlichen Verhandlungen velesenen 
Dokumente. 
Berlin, 1875. 
Arnim,Count Harry von. Replique ! 1a 1ettre du 
Prince de Bismarck, du 14 Avril. 1873. 
A Sa Majeste l'Empereur d'Al1emagne. 
Publi~e dans le Moniteur de l'Empire. 
Paris, 1876. Translation from t~ German 
Antwort. 
#Beust, Friedrich Ferd. Graf von.Ertnnerungen und 
Aufzeichnungen aus drei Viertel-Jahrhund-
erten. 
Stuttgart. 1887. 
Bismarck-Schoenhausen,Otto Edouard Leopold,Fftrst 
von. Anhang su den Gedanken und Erin-
nerungen. Two vols. Ed.Horst Kohl, 
stuttgart, 1901. ' See below, the "6or-
respondence of William the First," etc. 
Bismarck-Schoenhausen, Gedanken und Erinnerungen. 
English translation, Bismarck, the Man 
and the Statesman. A.B.Butler. Two vols. 
N. Y. and London,1899. This edition used 
exclusively in the preparation of this 
paper. ' 
Bismarck-Schoenhausen,The Correspondence of William 
the First and Bismarck. With other letters 
from and to Prince Bismarck. Translated 
and selected from the Anhang (see above) 
by J.A.Ford,l903. 
Bismarok-Sohoenhausen, Die Politische Reden des 
Fftrsten Bismar ck. Ed.Horst Kohl.Stuttgart. 
l882-l905.Vol.V:1870-73.Vol.Vi:1873-6. 
III 
Broglie, Le Duc de. La Mission de M.de Gontaut-
Biron! Berlin. 1896. A tract for mon-
archy; inspired by Gontaut's memoirs . 
Bnlow,Bernhard von. Imperial Germany.Tr.M.A.Lawenz. 
N.Y.19l4.Valuable for a point of view. 
Busch,Dr .Mortiz. Bismarck,Some Secrets of his Histo;y. 
English translation. Two vols.MacMillan; 
N.Y. and London, 1898. 
Cheusi,P.~ Gambetta,Life and Letters.Tr.V.M.Montagu. 
Lqndon. 1910. Contains a brief account of 
the projected visit to Bismarck in 1878. 
Daniel,A.L'Ann~e Politigue. Paris •• ~nual.Sometimes 
useful for a contemporary F~ench view. 
Contains references to current publica-
tions. 
Favre,Jules. Le Gouvernement de la Defense Uationale. 
Three vols. Paris 1871-5. 
Gabriac,Joseph Jule s Paul Marie Francois de Cadoine, 
Marquis de. Souvenirs dirlom~tigues d . 
Russie et d'Allemagne.1870-72.Paris.1896. 
Main interest in the conclusion of peace. 
IV 
Less prejudiced than Gontaut; perhaps 
because he did not remain so long under 
the shadow of Bismarck's will. 
v 
Gavard,Charles. A Diplomat in London. English trans-
lation N.Y.1897.Lettera and notea,18?1-77; 
written up in 1879. Lon~ and full account 
of alar.m of l875,from the point of view of 
ita effeot in London. 
Gontaut-Biron,Vdcomte de. Mon Ambassade en Allemagne. 
l872-3.Dreux,lI.Andrt\,Derni!res Annt\ea de 
l'Ambassade de M. de Gontaut-Biron.1874-7. 
Combined as Parts One and Two of the German 
translation: 
Gontaut '(see p 3}Meine Botschafterkeit am Berliner Hof. 
Gen.der Infanterie z.D.V.Pfaff.This trans-
lation used exclusively in this paper. 
Relentless anti-Germanism in every letter; 
every note. Hostility to Bismarck. Alannist 
tendency. 
Hohenlohe-Schillingffirst, FUrst Chlodwig zu.DenkWurd-
igkeiten.Two vola. Stuttgart and Leipzig. 
1907. One gets very little information 
from this punctilious old gentleman, but 
the German poin t of view. 
Kohl ,Horst. Bismarck-Jahrbuch.Berlin ,1894---- .No 
materi,al for our period. 
Kohl,Horst.Die Pilitische Reden des Fursten Bismarck. 
See above. 
VI 
Occupation et Liberation du Territoire,187l-3.Two vols. 
Paris. 1900. Correspondence. "Plusieurs 
lettres qui n'ont pas ~t~ retrouv~es, man-
quent A cette correspondance, N~anmoins, 
celles qui sont icic reproduites,permettent 
de suivre 1e prcgr~s des n~gociations q~i 
stouvrirent entre 1es Cabinets de Paris et 
de Berlin.-----" Thus characterized by the 
introductory note. Contains letters of Thiers, 
of Pouyer-Quertier,Gontaut-Biron,Saint Vallier, 
Manteuffel, von Fabrice, Arnim. Whooly with-
out editorial comment save for one explana-
tion of an apparent discrepancy in dates. 
Poschimger,H.Ritter von. Fnrst Bismarck und den 
Bundersrath. Vol.III,18?4-8.Communica-
tions. Analysis of acts od each session. 
" FUrst Bismarck und die Diplomaten.1852-90. 
Hamburg. 1900. 
Schulthess,H. Europaischer Geschishtskalendar.Vols.II-
XXXIII. l8?0.82. 
#Thiers,Adolphe.Notes et Souvenirs. Unpublished. 
Wilhelm der Grosse,Kaiser. Brief.,Reden, und Schreiben. 
Two vols.Berlin 1906.ED.Ernst Berner. 
C.Secondary works bearing directly on the topic, or contain-
ing original. materiaJ.. 
#Daudet,Ernst.Histoire diplomatique de l'a1liance Franco-
Russe. l8?3-93.Paris.1884. See also the little 
biographies of the same author,of tre Duc D' 
Aumale, Jules Simon, ar6chal acUahon. 
VII 
Egelhaaf,Gottlob.Geschichte der neuesten Zeit vorn Frank-
furter Frieden bis Zen Gegenwart Stuttgart 1909. 
#Geffcken,F.H.Frankreich,Russland,und der Dre1bund. 
Berlin, 1894. 
Hanot~ux,Gabriel.Histoire de la France Contemporaine. 
1871-1900. Four vols. Paris.n.d.English 
translation,E.Sparvel-Bayly.N.Y.1909.This 
translation used in this paper. Contains many 
selections from letters, notes, memoirs and 
documents, not here available; though accur-
ate citation of references is most unfortu-
nately largely neglected. Its political bias 
in favor of Republicanism makes itself felt. 
K6schwitz,Dr.Edouard.Les Fran9ais,avant.pendant,et 
apr~s 1 a guerre de 1870-0 ~ Translated from 
the German by Jules Felix. Paris.1897. 
#Laur,Francis.The Heart of Gambetta.Translated from the 
French by V •. M.Montagu. London,N.Y.1908. Con-
tains let ters in regard to the proposed visit 
to Bismarck in 1878. 
#Mathieu-Bodet. Les Finances Franqaises de 1870 A 1878. 
Tardieu, Andr6. France and the Alliances. MacMillan. 
N.Y.and London. 1908. The preface states that: 
"In this diplomatic drama----France has fought 
for the balance of pawer.----It exists today. 
VIII 
But it is unstable. The ehirs of Bismarck 
have not yet resigned themselves to the 
loss of the hegemony which, though it could 
be only temporary, he had secured for his 
country." This is the theme of the book. It 
is not unprejudiced in favour of prance. 
D. C~iticism of the trustworthiness of Bismarck as a Historian. 
Ford,Guy Stanton.Bismarck as Historiographer. Report of 
the American Historical Association for 1909, 
pp.125-l39. Pages l28-9,note,contain bibliography 
of criticism, and appreciation of the Gedanken 
und Erinnerungen. 
#Marcks,Erich.Fftrst Bismarck's Gedanken und Erinnerungen. 
Versuch einer kritischen Wftrdigung. 1899. 
Sorel.Albert.Etudes de literature et d'histoire.Paris. 
1901. The thirteenth essay. Les ' emoires de 
Bismarck.' 
Meinecke, .Historische ZeitschriftBand 82,pp.282-295. 
E. Periodioal Literature reflecting Contemporary Opinion of 
the Triple Alliance. 
Ellis, J. Barker. The Triple Entente and the Triple 
Alliance. Nineteenth Century and After,Vol. 
64,pp.1-17. 
Blind,Karl. A Plea for the Triple Alliance. National 
Review, ~ol.17,~p.767-783.Pro-German. 
Crispi,Francesco. The Dual and Triple Alliance.Nine-
teenth Century, Vol.42,pp.673-7. Baldest of 
statements. 
See Library of Congress, List of References on Europe 
and International Politics; H.B.Meyer, Chief 
Bibliographer. 1914. 
Note: The ? ost of this periodical literature on the alliance 
is on the occasion of rene al of the alliance; or on tne pos~­
t~on oItne aLl~ance ~n regard to the ~astern questl~n and the 
Balkan wars. ~here seems to have been very little discussion 
of the possible meaning of Bismarck's meeting with And assy in 
1879. In regard to Section B, it should be stated that one 
great difficulty which confronts the s t udent of this period, 
in addition to the fact that diplomatic archives are to a g~eat 
extent unopened, is the preponderance of French memoirs over 
the German. This inequality makes just inferences purely infer-
ences, without decisive quality. 
x 
Tre~y Provisions for Evacuation. 
Prel~inary Treaty of Versailles.Feb.26.l8?1.(Hertslet, 
State Papers. · 62,p.59) 
II After ratification of present treaty;City of 
Pards as far as forts on left bank of Seine. 
2) As early as possible:Ca1vados,l'Orne.la Sarthe , 
l'Eure-e~-Loir,Loiret~Loir-e'-Oher,Indse-et-Loir§. 
Yonne.To left bank of S~ineiSeine-Inferierre.l'Eure. 
§8ine-et-Marne.L'AUbe.Cote-~'0!. 
3) Between right bank of Seine and frontier,grad-
ually, from ratification of definitive peace , and 
pavrnent of first demi-millierd. 
a) Atter first half-milliard:Somme,Oise.SSine-
Interieure, Beine-et-Oise , Seine-et-Marne. on 
right bank, (See 2) 
b) After payment of second milliard, not more 
than: ¥arne. Ardennes, Haute-Marne, Vosges, 
Meurthe fortress of Belfort, to be occupied. 
German troops not to exceed 50,000. 
Treaty of Peace. May lO.lA?l.(Hertslet,State Papers. 
62,p. ??) 
XI 
l)After ratification,and first half milliard: 
Somme.S8ine-Inferieure,l'Eure, 
2) When German government considers order uffi-
oiently established: in -et01ee,Sei e-et-
Marne, S~lne. forts of Paris, Not to be retained 
in any case, after p~ent of third half-milliard. 
3) "The 9itpul~t1ons of the Treaty of Fe r ar 
twenty-sixth relative to the ocoupation of French 
territories after the p 
remain in force.-
ent of t 0 milliard 
Conventlon.Oct.12,l87l. (Hcrtslet,op,cit.62,p.8 .) 
After p~ent of fourth milliard and 1nt re t: 
l' A.isne Cote-
Convention. June 29, 1872. (lE1S.62,p.983.) 
Three milliards in three inetal 
1875. 
nte to ch 1, 
1) arne and Haute- arne, fifteen days 
half-milliard. 
2)~~~~~~~~~ 
half-milliard. 
" " 
• r fir 
on 
XII 
3)Meuse and Meurthe-et-Moselle, fifteen days after 
third milliard, and interest. 
4)B elfory, as ~). 
Convention. March 15, l8?3, (~, 63,P.10ll.) 
Four weeks after the fifth of July; Belfort, 
Ardennes, Meurthe-et-Mosella,Meuse, except Verdun. 
Verdu~, fifteen days after September fifth. 
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